Yugoslavia's Army

The Challenges of Transition

An unavoidable confrontation with the challenges posed by democratic reforms, civilian control of defense matters and joining the system of collective security could show that the crisis in the security zone towards Kosovo and Metohija is the smallest problem the Yugoslav army will have to put up with in the near future

AIM Belgrade, January 22, 2001

The Yugoslav public does not doubt that during its defense of the popular will expressed in elections, the Yugoslav army contributed greatly to the speedy and -- what is even more important -- peaceful fall of the Milosevic regime. Conflicting claims as to who did more to keep the army on the sidelines -- the Russians who claimed they talked the famous 63rd Airborne Brigade that was already on its way into returning to its barracks, or Yugoslav Chief of Staff Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic, who said that on the crucial day he refused to obey Milosevic's orders to act against half a million demonstrators in Belgrade -- has drawn the most attention in the past four months. As opposed to the Russians, Gen. Pavkovic has more reasons to further stress his role. This is so not only because his ouster is demanded by a part of the now ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), but because his position -- as opposed to that of Rade Markovic, head of the State Security Service -- is practically under the direct jurisdiction of Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica.

The incumbent Yugoslav army chief of staff, originally installed by Milosevic, survived the first and so far only meeting of the new Supreme Defense Council, attended by Vojislav Kostunica, Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic and Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, which resulted in several generals being either sacked or retired, including the former chief of staff and defense minister, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and the commanders of the Yugoslav Second Army and the navy. Montenegro secured the disbanding of the notorious Seventh Military Police Battalion, a unit Milosevic put together in case an intervention was needed in "Serbia's little neighbor." It is not known whether Pavkovic's dismissal was required at all, and if so, what arguments were used to reject it.

During the NATO bombing in the spring of 1999, Serbian state TV depicted Nebojsa Pavkovic, then commander of the Yugoslav Third Army, as a hero and the major protagonist of Yugoslavia's "victory." It is interesting to note that accusations against him after Oct. 5, do not question his role in the defense of the country, but the manner of his professional advancement, his consent to the anticonstitutional signing of the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement, and placing the army at the service of Slobodan Milosevic. Gen. Momcilo Perisic, who was ousted from the post of Yugoslav army chief of staff for publicly refusing to go to war with the greatest power in the world (in October, 1998), recalls: "Lazarevic (Vladimir Lazarevic, then commander of the Pristina Corps) and Pavkovic said back then that they would go down in history, that they would successfully defend the country, that not a single NATO soldier would set foot on Yugoslav soil -- but then their boss ordered them to withdraw. As soon as that order came, undefeated but humiliated, the army and police withdrew. Pavkovic and Lazarevic, the heads bowed in defeat, pulled the army out of Kosovo and Metohija."

Other allegations question Pavkovic's participation in Milosevic's election campaign, his insistence on referring to Milosevic as "the commander in chief," a public office that the constitution makes no mention of, his vague statements/threats that Sept. 24 (the day Milosevic lost in elections) would be "D-Day," his attempt to intimidate the striking Kolubara miners. And then there is the discovery that Pavkovic capitalized on his image by acquiring real estate in the plush Belgrade district of Dedinje, something that seems to have become a rule of thumb. Neither this, however, nor the fact that Nebojsa Pavkovic played a crucial role in forcing Milosevic to concede defeat on Oct. 6, should prevent Vojislav Kostunica, the federal government and Parliament from finally raising the issue not only of the current chief of staff, but all other military leaders as well, who during the past years failed to make a clear distinction between Milosevic and national interests.

Dr. Slobodan Krapovic, the third civilian to be Yugoslav defense minister (his predecessors were Milan Panic and Pavle Bulatovic, the latter killed in one of a series of still unsolved murders), explained in a recent interview in the Vreme weekly magazine the reasons why major changes in the defense sector had not yet been initiated. According to him, the FRY does not have an adequate defense platform, a basic document on which all other laws and regulations pertaining to the role, organization, size, and goals of the national defense are based, as well as the role of the Yugoslav army in carrying them out. Last August, Nebojsa Pavkovic, obviously as part of election campaign, informed the public that a new military platform had been "adopted." Disputes over this document, which, after the opposition's victory appears to have been adjusted to the new "circumstances," are still in progress.

A more important question is: Why has there for the past half century been no serious civilian control over the army -- regardless of all announcements by the Yugoslav Army General Staff -- which is a basic feature of any democratic system. The new defense minister believes that this is the most pressing issue. As far as the defense platform and related laws are concerned, serious changes are announced for the beginning of June. Mixed, civilian and military expert teams are already working out key proposals of a paper to be submitted to the federal Parliament.

The trouble is that Yugoslavia and its army have to undergo a major transformation while in quite poor shape. For years Milosevic has been systematically upgrading the police at the expense of the army, so that the size and the equipment of the former were almost equalized with the latter. Such a policy made the army occasionally play the role of a police service. Before he was replaced, Momcilo Perisic warned Milosevic that catastrophic consequences would follow if: (1) the tendency to use the army without following proper procedure continues; (2) certain military units are given special treatment; (3) persons who are not in charge continue to attempt to assume command over the army; (4) certain senior officers are circumvented in talks with Yugoslav army members; (5) illegal personnel policies and sidestepping of professional criteria continue; and (6) the illegal consolidation of the police continues, that is, if they continue to be granted military facilities, additional equipment and weapons. Neither these warnings, nor the proposals for solving the problems were accepted. Obedient generals were promoted, and the war with NATO ensued as if it were unavoidable... In the end, the army came out of it "victorious," despite hardly having anywhere to withdraw and spend winter, as three-fourths of its barracks were destroyed, and its budget for years was hardly sufficient to cover salaries and pensions.

Psychological consequences weren't less serious either. During the NATO bombing, according to all estimates, the army did an exceptional job. But, if undefeated in war, it was defeated otherwise, because it should soon join its enemy of a year or so ago. A package envisaging the return of the country to the international community, and its inclusion in European integration, clearly stipulates the joining of the Partnership for Peace program. No understanding for traumatic experience, enormous patience or a "grace" period await Yugoslavia. Realistically, internal divisions and outside pressure could, and very probably will, be instrumentalized to serve the interests of the international community, regardless of how they are viewed and judged.

The new federal authorities are fully aware of this problem. This is why only after pressure by certain non-government organizations that mandatory military service be shortened to six months, otherwise not substantiated at all, was the public advised that the Yugoslav army General Staff was finalizing a project on the issue. Not changing the current contingent of 50,000 conscripts annually, the army can easily reduce the length of service from the current 12 to 10 months. This could work if 19 to 30-year-olds are drafted, if a better system of conscription and distribution of conscripts is introduced, and if there is more order in postponing conscription...

Those who remember the beginning of the 1980s will find Yugoslav army press releases similar in vocabulary, logic and "mentality" to the former Yugoslav People's Army. Except on paper, professional service is not being mentioned at all. Instead, in projects to restructure the army, an until recently unimaginable option has been included: paying to avoid service. The General Staff failed to elaborate on the purpose of this plan, even less to explain whether this means that only the poor would have to serve. Will, for instance, humanitarian organizations, rich individuals or institutions be able to pay if they want their employees or clients not drafted?

The Yugoslav army has shown an even greater inability to deal with assessing the consequences of the country's joining the Partnership for Peace in changed circumstances. According to them, this would endanger the national identity, and state and national interests; it would undermine the principle of relying exclusively on internal resources; it would mean renouncing the country's sovereignty, because the Partnership for Peace is a means through which the U.S. rules Europe; the West would meddle in our internal relations; the armed forces would cost more, both in terms of money and facilities; NATO standards would have to be adopted in organizing and training units; the intelligence and security system would be threatened, as well as the military industry, forced to adjust to NATO standards...

Most of the objections is obviously a product of the system nurtured by Slobodan Milosevic for years. General Staff experts stressing the issue of sovereignty have failed to notice that the army renounced its sovereignty as early as 1985, after the so-called Paracin Case. Since that massacre committed in this town's barracks over 15 years ago by an ethnic Albanian conscript, the Yugoslav People's Army and, later, the Yugoslav Army, have no longer drafted Kosovo Albanians. A similar "omission" was made in the summer of 1990, when the General Staff's annual geopolitical conference was devoted to "Socialism as an international process"...

There are many more examples. As opposed to theories (whatever their nature), the upcoming practice would be limited to only two things: adjustment to the European concept of collective security and footing all bills. In that, and only that respect, the crisis on the border between southern Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija, which is still being referred to as "administrative," will be the least important challenge for the Yugoslav Army.

Aleksandar Ciric

(AIM)