Why DOS Will Not Split

There are two main reasons for insisting on the necessity of survival of the coalition: first, the size of the problems that should be resolved or rather the extent of the general state of devastation Milosevic's regime had led the country into and from which it should be saved. The other, no less politically and psychologically important reason is the fact that DOS enjoys several times higher confidence of the people than any individual party or minor coalitions which are members of it.

AIM Belgrade, January 9, 2001

Despite expectations of a big celebration, nothing spectacular has happened in Belgrade in the past few days. Even the number of the people in the streets and squares on New Year's Eve was much smaller than during the former protest gatherings of hundreds of thousand people. All this despite - and maybe that is exactly why – the "normal" state Serbia has stepped into after the federal elections of September 24, after the will of the citizens had been defended on October 5, and finally after the decisive victory of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) in Republican elections of December 23, 2000. With these three steps the political scene of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia has changed to such an extent that not even the greatest optimists could have imagined.

The Serb Revival Movement (SPO) of Vuk Draskovic and the Yugoslav Left (JUL) of Mirjana Markovic have been practically swept off the political scene. The former were the biggest opposition party in the last decade of the past century; since foundation in 1994, JUL had an influence on political circumstances in Serbia and FRY so big that it was completely out of proportions with the support it had actually had in the electorate (about 1.5 per cent in its best days). Its influence was dangerous: it became clear to what extent from the catastrophic defeat of its "sister" party - the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) of Slobodan Milosevic in the elections of September 24, and especially those of December 23.

That is how Milosevic's division of the traditional parliamentary scene into the Left - JUL, the centre - SPS, and the Right - Seselj's Radicals

• disappeared and was replaced by a new division of forces in the Assembly of Serbia which is dominated by DOS (175 out of 250 seats), 37 deputies of the SPS represent the left, while the right wing is occupied by the Radicals (SRS 23 seats) and the Party of Serb Unity (SSJ 14 deputies). In the meantime, DOS's "disposition in favour of a split" or establishment of two or three minor but "more natural" coalitions - which was openly discussed in October and November - was suppressed. Nowadays, the need for the DOS to remain united during the entire four-year term in office (or at least for as long as possible) is mentioned much more frequently.

There are two main reasons for stressing the necessity of the survival of the coalition. First, the proportions of the problems which should be resolved or, in other words, the state of general devastation Milosevic's regime had brought the country into and which it needs to be saved from. The second reason - politically and psychologically no less important - is the fact that DOS enjoys several times greater confidence than any individual party or minor coalition in it. As concerning the persons who will carry out the future state policy, things are even more obvious: after Vojislav Kostunica, the most popular persons are Miroljub Labus and Mladjan Dinkic, who have come to the posts of deputy prime minister of the federal government and governor of the National Bank, respectively, as experts of Group 17+ , and not as party members or leaders.

The candidate for prime minister of the government of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, is in this respect in an unenviable position, since favourable and unfavourable assessments of him by the public are completely divided. As a pragmatic politician - or as some media describe him, the one who would rather make mistakes than not do anything at all - Djindjic is aware that in the first year in power undivided support is necessary, specially because he does not deceive either himself or others that Serbia has already practically turned into the land of milk and honey. On the contrary.

The awareness of a very watchful eye that follows every step of the new authorities - starting from "spontaneous" crisis headquarters which took over control of several hundred institutions and enterprises in October - is so far the only regulator of behavior of the former opposition. At the same time, the DOS has so far successfully overcome the occasional mutual conflicts of its leaders making disagreements become part of a normal political discourse and public debates.

The same sort of political sobriety - despite occasional and individual outbursts of individuals - was manifested by DOS even in the gravest challenge so far, the crisis in three municipalities on the administrative border of Kosovo and Metohija. Whatever the immediate and the true cause may be of the raid of armed Albanians into the five-kilometre wide security land zone - spreading of terrorist operations to "Eastern Kosovo", an attempt of Milosevic's supporters to provoke introduction of a state of emergency, or a NATO test for the new democratic authorities in Serbia - the first round was, it seems quite convincingly, won by DOS. Vojislav Kostunica managed to transfer the problem into the part of the field that belongs to NATO forces according to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and Kumanovo agreement, to express good will and establish direct cooperation with KFOR in the field, and even to draw out certain signals of the possibility of changes of the provision on the width of the land security zone which - without the presence of Serbian police on the one and without the interest of KFOR to close the border for armed groups and individuals on the other side - started to turn into an "insecurity zone".

It seems that not only the tensions between Podgorica and Belgrade were relieved in a similar way, but also the full burden of responsibility for the division of FRY into two states was laid at Milo Djukanovic's door. As the president of FR Yugoslavia, at a recent session of the Supreme Defence Council, Vojislav Kostunica accepted to relieve of duty the commanders of the Second Army and the Navy, both stationed on the territory of Montenegro, and to disband the notorious 7th Battalion of Military Police formed by Milosevic in order to spread - or "prevent" - the conflict in Montenegro. A number of generals who might tread on Djukanovic's regime's toes either by active support to the former regime or by operations were sent into retirement.

On the other, Montenegrin, hand, long controversies concerning the Platform on Redefining Relations with Serbia ended with its passing - and seceding of the People's Party from the ruling coalition. That is how the Platform on very loose union of independent and previously internationally recognised states of Serbia and Montenegro, was supported only by Djukanovic's Democratic Party of Socialists and the Social Democratic Party, along with the Liberal League and Albanian parties. Unintentionally, this just reinforced Kostunica's stand that the question of the destiny of an already recognised and existing state cannot be subject of an agreement of two ruling coalitions or parties.

In Serbia Montenegrin Platform was received calmly, with an estimate here and there that this is the end of the process of disintegration of former SFRY. While announcing the forthcoming - still not held - meeting with Kostunica and Djukanovic, Zoran Djindjic declared that the key difference concerning the future of the federal state was that Serbia and President of FRY believe that mutual relations should be redefined by federal Constitutional amendments, while the Montenegrin party demanded first formal separation and then everything else.

The split of the ruling coalition has already led to the announcement of early parliamentary elections in Montenegro - with previous obliging of all the participants that the already announced referendum on independence would be scheduled and conducted. This condition might be a sign of certain giving in on the part of Djukanovic's administration. On the other hand, Belgrade analysts assess that - whatever it may be - the outcome of the referendum might more probably lead to a conflict within Montenegro itself than to big disturbances in Serbia. It is certain that the "departure" of Montenegro would be painful for a large part of the public, but the measures and criteria of that public have in the past ten years been considerably lowered. In the physical sense, Serbia is entering the 21st century with a territory slightly bigger than in 1878; psychologically, the most important border of dissolution was crossed with the entrance of NATO troops into Kosovo. In this sense, the "departure" of Montenegro could be a relief if it would mean definite loss of Kosovo and Metohija - and moreover lay the blame for it on the Montenegrins as the ones who had made the decision about it.

In a sense much more serious problems await the democratic authorities of Serbia and Yugoslavia after the expiry of the "six-month honeymoon" with the international community. The good results of the changes are that FRY has in less than three months done by far more for the relations with its neighbours and the world than Milosevic's status of the "guarantor of peace" after signing of the Dayton peace accords. FRY has already established diplomatic relations with B&H, Slovenia, France, Germany and Great Britain; re-establishment of relations with Albania has already been announced. According to the estimate of Goran Svilanovic, foreign minister, the medium-term plan includes joining of the EU, improvement of relations with the neighbours, especially the countries on the territory of former Yugoslavia, stabilisation of the circumstances in the region, drawing nearer to the policy of European countries, improvement of relations with the USA and continuation of full cooperation with other big partners outside Europe, Russia and China.

What is much considered and discussed here is the question what will happen when, according to clear indications, already at the end of March it will become necessary to prove political resoluteness to break off with the past. The first on the list is indeed the question of extradition of Slobodan Milosevic and other persons indicted in The Hague. Kostunica's professional and political reservation towards the Tribunal will be at a serious test then. Looking into the possibility of bringing Milosevic to trial in Belgrade was certainly on the agenda of the talks Goran Svilanovic had in Washington in the first week of January. On the eve of this visit, The Washington Post and the London Financial Times dealt with the problems of the new Yugoslav authorities and with what they were expected to do. The Washington Post points out that the authorities in Serbia must dismantle Milosevic's police apparatus, reinforce the freedom of the press and independent judiciary and break down the criminal "gangs" which are stifling the economy. Only then will they have a better chance to deal successfully with three complex issues: independence of Kosovo and Montenegro and the problem of Milosevic's status "which will probably be the test for the relations with the West". In the same way and listing the same problems, The Financial Times concludes that "it is now important to stabilise Serbia, but extradition of Milosevic will be the price Serbia will have to pay in order to become a normal country".

The election triumph of DOS was greatly based on the need of the voters to become citizens of a “normal and boring” country. In connection with the destiny of Slobodan Milosevic, it is at this moment obviously considered in what way this transfer to “normality” would neither be the result of pressure nor a precedent of extradition – and trial for war crimes – to a former head of a state. Just before the New Year, deputy prime minister Miroljub Labus confirmed the existence of the deadline for decision-making on the responsibility of Slobodan Milosevic for the crimes he is indicted for. After March 31 “voting in international financial organisations will directly depend on that decision”, said Labus and added, perhaps significantly: “The world does not force us to have Milosevic tried in The Hague, but clear diplomatic messages have been sent to us that we are expected to raise the question of his responsibility ourselves, in a civilised and true manner... This is no blackmail, but a normal expectation that our judiciary operate like in other countries of Europe we wish to be a part of”.

Aleksandar Ciric

(AIM)