Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal, Coming to Belgrade

Where will Milosevic be Tried

AIM Belgrade, January 8, 2001

When the Chief Prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal Carla del Ponte comes to Belgrade next week to demand extradition of Slobodan Milosevic, former president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, indicted for the crimes in Kosovo, she will not settle down for the answers given so far by her Yugoslav hosts that “this is not a priority question for a state which has just come out of dictatorship”, or that “the Tribunal in The Hague is not the one that should try Milosevic”, and least of all that “the trial to Milosevic would be a trial to the Serb people”. She, as announced, expects specific answers and not only when Slobodan Milosevic is concerned. It should not be forgotten that the indictments in The Hague include the names of three protagonists of the Vukovar developments – Veselin Sljivancanin, Mile Mrksic and Miroslav Radic, but also those of Dragoljub Ojdanic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, that there are suspicions that Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are in FRY. The talks might refer, therefore, directly to the destiny of at least twenty odd persons. Yugoslav officials, and for the time being it was confirmed only that Del Ponte will be received by Goran Svilanovic, will be expected to offer confirmation of recognition of the legitimacy of The Hague Tribunal and not just through opening of the office of this court in Belgrade.

President of FRY Vojislav Kostunica has never concealed his stand concerning the Tribunal. This is confirmed, among other, by his latest declaration that “in a way, there is a conflict of jurisdiction between our courts and some which claim the right to try political or military leaders from this region”, “I am, of course, it is well known, and nothing will change in that stand, very suspicious concerning the manner in which The Hague Tribunal operates, but, on the other hand, there is this obligation of cooperation with the Tribunal which can proceed in various ways and in which the Tribunal itself can offer proof of its objectivity”, said Kostunica in the interview to the Voice of America in the first days of this year and warned that The Hague Tribunal had “on several occasions raised doubts about those proofs of objectivity”.

One should be reminded that by signing the Dayton Peace Accords Slobodan Milosevic has accepted full cooperation with The Hague Tribunal but that later representatives of the former regime have persistently claimed that “Yugoslav Constitution does not permit extradition of the indicted to the Tribunal”. This allegation, according to the estimate of some experts such as Dr. Pavle Nikolic, simply is not true. “The supreme legal document of Yugoslavia explicitly prescribes that a Yugoslav citizen cannot be deprived of citizenship, banished from the country or extradited to other states. However, this is not a case of extradition to another state but to an international institution behind which stands almost the entire international community”, he stresses. Indeed, the regime of Slobodan Milosevic has itself, at the time when it was “on good terms with the international community”, in March 1996 extradited Drazen Erdemovic and Radoslav Kremenovic, citizens of FRY born in Republika Srpska, but refused to do it with the Vukovar trio just a month later.

Goran Svilanovic, Yugoslav foreign minister, indicated a change in the official policy of FRY concerning the trial of Milosevic by having stated that “FRY will meet its obligations to The Hague Tribunal” and after the meeting with US State Secretary Madeleine Albright announced establishment of a truth commission composed of international and local experts who would investigate facts on the war crimes committed in the last decade in Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Kosovo. In a speech at the American Institute for Peace, Svilanovic stated the establishment of the commission as the first possible step towards opening of the proceedings against war crimes on the territory of former Yugoslavia. After that, as he said, one of the four possibilities of conducting the proceedings against the indicted would be considered. As the first possibility he stated their extradition to the International Tribunal in The Hague for the war crimes committed on the territory of former SFRY, as the second the organisation of sessions of this Tribunal in Belgrade, as the third a combined trial with the participation of The Hague Tribunal and Yugoslav courts, and as the third proceedings organised by local judiciary with observation of all international legal norms.

Whether this is a hint of possible resolving differences between Belgrade and the International Tribunal for War Crimes will be clear when Carla del Ponte visits Belgrade, and perhaps even before that in view of the reaction of Federal Prime Minister Zoran Zizic who accused Svilanovic of having deviated from the official Yugoslav policy when The Hague Tribunal is concerned. It is indicative that the USA, at least according to the statement of Madeleine Albright, have expressed readiness for having “Slobodan Milosevic tried in Belgrade but under jurisdiction of the International Tribunal in The Hague. This is a question between Belgrade and the Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte”, who, according to the spokesman of this Tribunal still insists that the trial take place in The Hague. Spokesman of the State Department Richard Boucher explained more precisely the latest American stand by stressing that “in The Hague means in The Hague Tribunal wherever it may take place”. The officials of the Tribunal reacted immediately. “The indictments for war crimes against Slobodan Milosevic and others were raised by The Hague Tribunal and this Tribunal is the only place where they should be tried – that is what it was founded for”, said the spokesman of the Tribunal Christian Chartier and stressed that “the Tribunal cannot enter into any political deals because it is a legal institution with a clear mandate which includes trials to persons occupying high posts”. The spokeswoman of the Prosecutor's office Florence Hartman also explained that “Yugoslavia should cooperate with the Tribunal and not the Tribunal with Yugoslavia” and that “if low-ranking persons are tried in the Hague, certainly the political and military leaders such as Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic should be tried there”.

Yugoslav experts, such as the expert on international law Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic, think that it is possible to find other solutions “but it is not clear with whom. It would be best for us to nominate one of our judges as a candidate for an additional judge. There is another possibility, and that is exactly why the Tribunal was founded as an alternative court if a national court refuses to try criminals. We could, therefore, say: the state has changed, give us an opportunity to try Milosevic ourselves first, and then if pursuant the statute of the Tribunal you are not satisfied with the manner, procedure, etc., you can take over. This, however, might be possible to achieve when Milosevic is concerned, but it can hardly be achieved for the Vukovar trio and others since for years there was no wish to try them. For some kind of a mixed tribunal Security Council would have to reach a special solution, to establish some sort of a mixed tribunal, and as concerning our court in Belgrade which would be established by us, I remember the words of judge Zoran Ivosevic who simply thinks that our judiciary is not mature enough even for simpler tasks, least of all such as these”, Dimitrijevic estimates.

It would be very bad for Yugoslavia, experts assess, if under the motto of increasing demands that Milosevic be primarily tried for everything he has done in the country to his compatriots, suspicion were a priori rejected that he is guilty, as a large part of the world sees him, “of having commenced four wars and being responsible for between 200 and 300 thousand victims”. On the other hand, it would certainly be no good if, as future Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic says, “by extradition to The Hague”, which he personally does not reject as a possibility, although “investigation of Milosevic's activities in the country has priority”, “Milosevic were presented as a victim of international policy which might enable him to win sympathy”. The worst possible would be if the question of The Hague Tribunal, against which Zarko Korac warns, disunited the Democratic Opposition of Serbia: “This is the last thing we wish to happen. Maybe it would be the simplest to try him in Yugoslavia where it would politically and psychologically by far be easier”. If only The Hague Tribunal would agree to that in one way or another. Concerning this matter Yugoslav diplomacy, but whole of Serbia as well, will without any doubt have to pass its first serious test in order to join the international community.

Tatjana Stankovic

(AIM)