Strained Relations Between Croatia and the Hague

AIM Zagreb, December 13, 2000

The news that nearly caused the disintegration of Ivica Racan's coalition government in the beginning of August - that the International Tribunal for War Crimes in the Hague (ICTY) was going to bring charges against the Chief of General Staff of the Croatian Army Petar Stipetic - was officially, in a much milder form, confirmed in early December. Stipetic was summoned to an interview, i.e. as a witness which is to be held in Zagreb. The Hague investigators want to hear everything that Stipetic might tell them about the events after the operation "Storm" in August 1995 when the Croatian Army liberated the region of Knin, the most important stronghold of the rebel-Croatian Serbs.

Obviously, long before it was officially published, the Croatian Government knew that the Hague Tribunal was interested in Stipetic. It seems that this had happened already in August, when the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte visited Zagreb and talked to Prime Minister Racan and the Croatian President Stipe Mesic. Although Del Ponte's interest for Stipetic was carefully concealed, nevertheless the information on this leaked so that when Drazen Budisa, Racan's strongest ally in the coalition government of six parties, learned about this piece of news seriously undermined his alliance with the Prime Minister. Namely, Budisa is much more inflexible concerning the cooperation with the Hague, while his party's stand (HSLS) does not essentially differ from those of hard-lining HDZ.

Careful observers of less than idyllic relations between the Croatian authorities and ICTY, which during HDZ rule were so strained that, at one time, Croatia was seriously warned of the possibility of sanctions being imposed against on account of its refusal to cooperate, have surely noted the increasingly harsh Croatian manner with which Zagreb addressed to the Hague. In this Dr Goran Granic, Deputy to the Prime Minister Racan and President of the Council for Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, took the initiative. In his extremely biting address in late November, Granic presented many assessments - about the cooperation with the Hague – unheard of during Tudjman's rule. In an interview he literally said: "We will not agree to the Hague's demand even if that means UN sanctions for Croatia"!

It was quite clear already then that the Hague net had been thrown on all the Croatian big fish and that Racan's Government will have great problems. Well aware of the fact that their future depend much on the Hague's moves - if the ICTY Prosecutor's Office issues indictments against Croatian generals, the new authorities will find themselves in a hopeless situation. The attempt at extraditing Mirko Norac and Anto Gotovina, for whom the Hague Tribunal has allegedly already prepared the indictments, would cause such an attack from the Right which the six-member coalition Government would not be able to withstand. All the more as there is not much agreement in its own ranks regarding cooperation with the Hague.

That is why the stand of the Croatian Government was published in a form of a letter addressed to ITCY, practically simultaneously with the publication of the information on the request received from the Hague Tribunal for General Petar Stipetic to appear as a witness before the investigators. This letter contains 13 rather strict points, practically conditions, very similar to those from the letter Racan's Deputy Granic sent to ICTY on November 18, which was very badly received in the Hague.

Thus, Croatia demanded that The Hague Tribunal should not investigate legitimate military operations, such as the "Storm" and "Flash", but only specific crimes. Further on, it demanded the respect of "the time sequence", i.e. for those crimes which happened first to be the first to be investigated. That meant that Croatia disagreed for possible crimes committed after the "Storm" in 1995 to be investigated first, without previous investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by YPA in 1991 and later on, during the war in Croatia.

Among more inflexible Croatian demands was the one that ICTY "should have in mind the criterion of the gravity of the committed crime, irrespective of the perpetrator's position in the formal authorities, and abandon its stand that it would persecute only the responsible person in "leading positions"". It seems that this Croatian stand is a direct answer to Stipetic's summons - namely, during the "Storm", in August 1995, he was commander of the Croatian Army units in the former UN Sector North, which covered the region of Banija and Kordun.

As it is well known - the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (HHO) documented these data - some 267 Serbian civilians had been killed in these actions, and immediately after the military operations ended. The situation was even more tragic in the former UN Sector South

• namely, according to HHO data, 410 civilians had been killed, which means that the operation "Storm" took the toll of 677 civilian lives.

Although there were no objections to the way Stipetic carried out these operations - he even received congratulations on the military victory from the Commander of the 21st Kordun Corps of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Col Cedomir Bulat - the Hague Tribunal might try him just for being in charge of the operation. Namely, Article 7 of the ICTY Statute states that the violation of the international laws of war committed by a subordinate "does not exonerate his superior officer from criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate will commit or has committed such an act, but did not take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish such acts of perpetrators".

Very soon, true unofficially, followed the Hague reactions to unbending stands of the Croatian Government regarding further cooperation with the Tribunal. Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt, who was already active in the matter of Croatian relations with ICTY, said that the Prosecutor's Office "is not investigating the legality of the military operation, but crimes that have been committed". Directly arguing with Prime Minister Racan, Blewitt characterised his views as "contrary to previously expressed readiness of the Croatian authorities to cooperate in this respect". He did not hide his disappointment that the communications between the Croatian Government and ICTY were being carried out publicly, through the media.

However, the media were the ones that, citing well-placed sources, informed what Blewitt only suggested when he mentioned that the indictments for crimes committed during the "Storm" "are almost completed". Thus, the highest-circulation daily "Vecernji list" (the Evening Paper), mentioned the names of as many as six generals (Mirko Norac, Ante Gotovina, Ivan Korade, Damir Krstacevic, Rahim Ademi and Mladen Markac), and the former Minister of the Interior, Ivan Jarnjak. According to the "Evening Paper" the background of the summons sent to General Stipetic is not fully known, i.e. instead of being a witness, can he become the Hague accused.

The Croatian Government has found itself in an unenviable position and is actually footing the bill left to it by the former Tudjman authorities. Had war crimes been prosecuted after the "Storm" and the culprits punished, nothing of this would have happened. It will be very hard for Racan and his Government if ICTY issues indictments against Croatian generals. Irrespective of what it will do, it will find itself in a hopeless situation - if it refuses to extradite the wanted generals, that will most certainly make its position towards the international community equal to that it had during HDZ's rule, which practically means new isolation of Croatia.

If it agrees to send generals to the Hague, the Right will interpret that as the act of national treason in which it will be probably supported by a large part of radicalised public which was reassured for years that the Croats couldn't have committed war crimes in the liberation war.

That is why the statement of Graham Blewitt on ICTY not intending to bring charges against anyone new this year is a poor consolation for Racan and his Cabinet. It means just a short, brief break. Namely, there are less than three weeks till the end of the year so that the beginning of 2001 will mark the beginning of a veritable nightmare for Racan and his Ministers.

Drago Hedl

(AIM)