The Anatomy of a Crisis

Armed-Diplomatic Zone

While DOS is exhibiting the utmost rationality and responsibility towards the crisis in the Presevo Valley, parties of the former regime are offering their old politics which has resulted in the emergence of armed extremist groups and, in the end, the placing of Kosovo under the international protectorate as the only possible option.

AIM Belgrade, December 18, 2000

Some twenty five kilometres long and five kilometres wide belt is the scene of activity of the illegal Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (UCPBM). By their activities - laying of pressure-activated mines on roads, attacks on police, murders and abductions of civilian population - its members have caused one of the gravest crisis in Europe. Namely, all this is happening in the "land security zone" on the territory of the communes of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja in which there are some 60 thousand Albanians. According to the provisions of the Kumanovo Agreement, the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) is not allowed to enter five kilometres deep into the zone, and the police can enter it only without heavy weapons and in a strictly limited number.

Although UCPBM has been active for over a year, its latest attack of November 22, when three policemen were killed and thirteen wounded, and the taking of positions on the Kosovo brim of the buffer zone, are threatening to be the last straw. More specifically: there are demands that VJ and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia be allowed to enter the "forbidden zone" with the required equipment and thus again come into conflict with NATO which is unbending when it comes to the provisions of Military-Technical Agreement from Kumanovo. Only rationality and patience of official Belgrade have prevented such developments. However, UCPBM is still holding its positions in the hills with mortars. On the other hand, the edge of the buffer zone towards Serbia has been turned into a veritable testing ground of VJ and MUP forces which is swarming with people and equipment. The vicinity of the main railway and motorway routes Belgrade-Thessaloniki, is additionally complicating the whole situation: from time to time citizens block the road near Bujanovac demanding that "Army and police be allowed to do their job" as the organising committee of protests has put it. On the other hand, UCPBM is not hiding that one of its aims is the disruption of communications on this major route.

Apart from minor provocations of the Albanian extremists, the situation has come to a stalemate. Of crucial importance for understanding the reasons which have brought about this situation and ways for its resolution, are the plans and positions of the main protagonists - UCPBM and the Albanian politicians, the international community and the current, as well as former, Yugoslav authorities.

At first glance, the simplest is the position of the Albanian extremists. Their objective is the annexation of the communes of Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja to the self-proclaimed independent Kosovo, and the method is the same one once successfully employed by KLA, which UCPBM has originated from. In other words, they have chosen constant attacks on the police so as to provoke armed response and reprisals, and use civi lian victims as a cause for dragging NATO into the war as an ally. In this all means are used so that the extremists have both Serbian and Albanian population as their target, who have fled in large numbers from the risk zone so as to avoid being caught in a crossfire. However, it can be hardly said that UCPBM enjoys broader support in Kosovo except for the emotional one which is free of charge. Actually, operations of its members are considered as just another lever in the local political fight.

Namely, despite the inflammable rhetoric of all participants, the local elections held there showed that the citizens have placed their trust in Ibrahim Rugova's moderate faction. In order to preserve the positions and privileges they have won in the last year and a half, the extremists - personified by the former KLA commander Hashim Thaqi - simply have to build up the crisis and increase the threat of war in the region.

That cannot be done by only political or mob murders in Kosovo itself, but also by armed operations "in big style". Since Macedonia is not suitable for something like that (international military presence and the participation of Albanian parties in the authorities), the communes of Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja have turned out to be the only possible place. However, this is not where the story ends: the extremist leaders also use armed activities in the Presevo Valley in their intrigues – the moment one of them demonstrates willingness to cooperate and undertakes certain responsibilities from KFOR, the same day another one sabotages that by some heinous crime.

The international community embodied in UNMIK and KFOR, is the prisoner of both the situation in Kosovo, as well as of its policy towards Serbia. The consistent application of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 would imply not only the disarming of former KLA, but also the implementation of rigorous security measures against its leaders and members.

The lack of political will and resolve to apply them is being justified by fear from extremists' attacks on members of international missions in Kosovo and escalation of terrorism. It is also estimated that permitting VJ and MUP of Serbia to wipe out UCPBM in the land security zone, would also consolidate the position of extremists in the political life of Kosovo and even more destabilise the peace process. Certain inertia is also present here: used to past behaviour of official Belgrade and burdened by the need to justify the last year's intervention, the relevant international factors are finding it hard to cope with the newly created situation. Same as in the beginning in Kosovo; needless to say, it was the American support that made it possible for Thaqi to become one of the national leaders.

Essentially, after initial wandering, the new Yugoslav authorities and the provisional Serbian Government, i.e. the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) have reacted very well to the crisis in the Presevo Valley. Instead of beating their chest, they put diplomacy ahead of a patriotic and military-police offensive. Also, visits of FRY President Vojislav Kostunica and other federal and republican officials to the crisis region have additionally contributed to calming down the situation. However, these rational and responsible acts were the ones that marked the beginning of the political-propaganda "Jihad" of the former ruling parties of Serbia - was it really unexpected - the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Yugoslav Left. In their parliamentary and public addresses they now speak about the occupation of a part of the Yugoslav territory, about treason and similar things. They are also active in organising the road blockades around Bujanovac. They offer their old policy which has led to the emergence of extremist Albanian armed groups and finally turned Kosovo into the international protectorate, as the only possible option manipulating with justified fears and frustration of citizens.

Partly as an answer to these accusations, and partly with a view to demonstrating to both the local and international public its determination to defend the state sovereignty and constitutional-legal order, Governments of FR Yugoslavia and Serbia held their joint session in Bujanovac, which was also attended by Kostunica. A coordinating body for Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja was established, headed by the Serbian Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic and Federal Minister for Minorities, Rasim Ljajic, as his deputy. According to the Federal Prime Minister Zoran Zizic, this body will be entrusted with "coordinating the state and political measures and activities for the resolution of the crisis". Nevertheless, whatever these measures and activities might be, the only way to resolve this, as well as many other problems, is for Serbia to develop into a normal European state.

Philip Schwarm

(AIM)