Transitional Yugoslavia

The Church, the State and the Borders

AIM Belgrade, December 13, 2000

The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) - in power in FR Yugoslavia, the accomplice in the transitional government of Serbia - still enjoys the status of the favourite of the public and the favourite in the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Serbia. The phrase "still enjoys" can be read and interpreted in different ways. A part of the public is discontented with constant conflicts within the victorious coalition of 18 parties, another part considers that the public disagreements prove the depth and the seriousness of political changes after September elections. On wrangling within Milosevic's regime, in the best Bolshevik tradition, the public always learnt only after the disobedient had been executed. In this sense, a part of political leaders and a certain number of analysts of Serbian political scene can hardly wait for the DOS to fall apart. Because, according to them, only after the monarchists separate from the republicans, civic from national democrats, centralists from regionalists - in other words all those who had gathered only around the objective to overthrow Milosevic's regime - will it be possible to engage in serious business of reconstruction of the country according to standards known to the world.

The key motive for creation of such a variegated coalition, Slobodan Milosevic, is alive and, supposedly, in good health. For his place of residence he has chosen the "white house" in Uzicka street No. 15, not far from the house which was bombed by NATO last year. It is not known why he is not using the house in Tolstojeva street No. 33, if the reason is not the reconstruction works of this "family home". According to rumours, Milosevic is protected by a very significant security force and according to the estimate of Belgrade Vreme weekly, the reason for that might be protection of the family from clients and organisations Milosevic's son Marko "successfully dealt" with in the previous several years.

Expectations that the winners would immediately after October 5 start with massive "spring cleaning of the state" have not come true, not even on the level of the symbols of Milosevic's regime. Heads of the army and state security service, general Nebojsa Pavkovic and Rade Markovic, not only remained at their posts, but are evidently highly engaged in the crisis in the south of Serbia. Some of the systems essential for maintenance of normal living - electric power supply and heating, at this moment the most important ones - operate worse than at the time of NATO bombing. Struggles for personnel changes at the posts essential for reception of urgent foreign aid without which survival is barely possible, are fought for more than obvious reasons of partial interests of the members of the victorious coalition.

The heated atmosphere occasioned by the raid of the territory of Serbia by an undetermined number of members of the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja from Kosovo is pacifying only in the public statements of representatives of Yugoslav authorities. There is no threatening rattling of sabres by numerous units of all sorts of special forces of the police and the army, nor an ultimatum of NATO forces which guard the border between Kosovo and Serbia. American units which are in charge of that part of the territory of Kosovo have not done their job as they should have; it is a question whether - concerned for the lives and security of their own soldiers - they will do it at all.

The militant declarations of some of the leaders of DOS were mollified by president of FRY Vojislav Kostunica who shifted the responsibility for the situation in the security zone onto the United Nations Security Council and NATO, and - by the invitation to negotiations addressed to Ibrahim Rugova - onto the leaders of Kosovo Albanians.

The key leaders and organisations of the international community condemned "extremist forces" of Kosovo Albanians for the incidents on the territory of Bujanovac, and Ibrahim Rugova rejected the invitation to talks by stating that "time has not come yet" for them. The Security Council and NATO joined in condemnation of the instigators of the incident, but at the same time avoided the possibility of amending the parts of the SC Resolution 1244 and Kumanovo agreement which regulate the question of jurisdiction in the 5-kilometre wide security zone on the territory of Serbia along the border with Kosovo.

By passing the hot potato into the hands of representatives of international community and internal Albanian conflicts between Rugova and Thaci, Vojislav Kostunica appealed on all the politicians in the country to restrain themselves from “tactless declarations and war-cries” stressing that “this is not the time for war, but for wise diplomatic action” and the necessity of a peaceful solution of all problems. Among the reproached “warriors” some people recognised Zoran Djindjic who will head the government of Serbia after December 23 elections, and others accused the supporters of the overthrown Milosevic's regime in the police for the insufficiently explained withdrawal of the police from check-points around Bujanovac and the subsequent stirring up of a belligerent atmosphere.

Unlike to the situation in the south of Serbia, the problem of the relations between Montenegro and Serbia has a long time ago exceeded the level of an incident and transformed into a race of Montenegrin leaders on the one hand and democratic changes in Serbia on the other. Also unlike the incident near Bujanovac and Presevo – which at one moment caused interruption of traffic on the main railway and road connecting Belgrade and Thessaloniki – Serbian-Montenegrin disagreement has not been put under control and it is not clear whether it ever will be.

On the other hand, post-October public opinion polls still show benevolence of the citizens towards the winners, understanding for the situation in which resolving of certain key problems cannot even begin before the new assembly of Serbia is constituted in January 2001, but also clear support to the united (until recently) opposition. Individual rating of members of DOS has gone up after the victory in September elections. It seems that in this sense Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia has profited the most. It is impossible to obtain precise data on the number of its new members, equally as the data on reduction of the membership of SPS, regardless of whether the cause is foundation of two new socialist parties or running over to the camp of the winners. And when just until recently Milosevic's elite troops, the Yugoslav Left, are concerned, on the day when the deadline for submitting lists of candidates for the elections expired, it had not managed to collect even half of the required 10 thousand signatures of support.

In such an atmosphere, Vojislav Kostunica decided to pay a private visit to Hilandar monastery at Mount Athos. In this way the old but especially the new Orthodox believers got another reason for inclination towards the new Yugoslav president, along with the Serb Orthodox Church which had openly supported DOS at the moments of post-election uncertainty in October. The only trouble is that in his private visit the President of FRY was accompanied not only by federal prime minister Zoran Zizic, but by no less than – 17 federal ministers!

Such a large quantity of “collective privacy” provoked different reactions, from mockery with the question whether “Voja (Vojislav Kostunica) is an Ayatollah” to suspicion that FR Yugoslavia was led by an “Orthodox fundamentalist” government. Much more seriously, this visit restarted discussions about the status of the Church in democratic Yugoslavia. The Church dignitaries, perhaps expecting something like a “counter-favour”, often and greatly insist on introduction of cathechism in elementary and secondary schools, and inclusion of the divinity college into Belgrade University. After the meeting with federal minister of religion on December 5, Branicevo Bishop Ignjatije stated at the press conference the stand of the Church that cathechism ought to be a compulsory school subject, adding that this did not mean that it would be imposed on everybody. But according to his words, in the beginning of each school year the parents would declare their stand only in case they do not wish their children to learn cathechism. The minister in charge assessed that it was “unnecessary to speak whether cathechism should be introduced into schools because it belongs in the sphere of human rights”, adding that the most important thing was to find an adequate model “because our state is a multi-religious environment”.

The most ardent opponents of this initiative of the Church are non-governmental organisations which are engaged in the sphere of human rights and quite a large number of public figures who warn that the question of religion is a private matter of the citizens, and a lay state is a democratic standard won a long time ago. The post-communist restraint in condemnation of the behavior of the Church in the past decades or in the latest developments limits the clarity of stands of the opposed parties. Problems of multi-religiousness and equality of religions and possibly different "cathechisms" were primarily stressed.

A much clearer answer arrived from the University: theology at the university – fine, but on condition that the Divinity College, its curriculum and students, meet university standards. No answer has arrived from the Orthodox divinity college yet on what they think about election and re-election for teachers' titles, scientific foundation, verification and criticism of research and the teaching process at the university.

Aleksandar Ciric

(AIM)