Government in Republika Srpska: With or Without SDS

The Alliance for Changes is no solution, because nationalism in B&H is not a virus that only political parties are infected by, but of the whole society. Indeed, is not every party from the potential Alliance closer to its "own" ethnic party against which it is entering the coalition than to the party "closest" to it but belonging to the other ethnic group

AIM Banja Luka, December 6, 2000

After November elections Bosnia & Herzegovina resembles as much a cheerless as a careless society of stubborn voters, stubborn politicians and stubborn foreigners, all of whom produce incomparably more answers than questions. The result is the conclusion that it B&H squander five years of peace with greater ease than three and a half years of the war.

Not even five years since Dayton chances for peace in Bosnia are weighed, as the foreigners wrongly believed, by the level of democratisation of Belgrade and Zagreb, but equally as in 1995 when Franjo Tudjman was still healthy and Slobodan Milosevic powerful, by the number of SFOR soldiers in the field and the extent of political and financial pressure exerted by the foreigners. It would probably be sufficient to come to the conclusion that ten years ago the guns that entered Bosnia did pass through Tudjman's and Milosevic's hands, but the inclination to carry them was authentically local. None of the foreign officials in B&H have raised that question because it is the matter of their favourite dogma, but they still act as if the deeply divided society will be patched back together once the destructive influences from Belgrade and Zagreb weakened (which has already happened) and once this or that party were brought to power (at least when RS is concerned, that has also happened). But to no avail.

INTERBAL SENSE OF THE ALLIANCE: The cynical remark that the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosniacs have voted as ethnically aware patriots but that they in fact wish to live as cosmopolitans has shown that the concept of B&H imposed by the foreigners is hopelessly worn out, that the virus they had decided after Dayton to fight against has mutated and that the previously applied drugs have no affect any more.

Of course, the virus is that of nationalism: Tudjman and Boban are dead, Milosevic and Karadzic are close to being that, while Alija Izetbegovic has with his last ounce of energy managed to keep body and soul of his party together at least for the time being. But nowadays there is nobody in RS who would not assess the rigid moralist pro-Bosnian rhetoric of Haris Silajdzic as first-class chauvinism, just as there is nobody in the Federation who would not say the same about Mladen Ivanic while he is offering a hand of salvation to the Serb Democratic Party (SDS). Of course, the foreigners not only see these two as men who should play an important role in the authorities, but as men who should work together.

And while the foreigners welcome the idea of Zlatko Lagumdzija about the Alliance for Changes which ought to eliminate on all levels of power (in the Federation, B&H, RS) the SDS, the SDA and the HDZ, Silajdzic has decided that it was the best time to remind them of the idea on introducing a two-chamber assembly and ethnically mixed presidency of RS. Milorad Dodik and Ivanic drawn into the negotiations on the Alliance, volens-nolens, were in the line of duty forced to swoop down on Silajdzic which has already become customary among the politicians in RS whenever he makes a statement exceeding the length of three lines.

The problem, however, is not Silajdzic, but the political implication of the Alliance. It should be established primarily in order to eliminate ethnic parties from power. But there is no answer to the question which are the internal possibilities of the heterogeneous Alliance due to which the people in Bosnia should be convinced that it is capable to ensure a better life for them. If the answer is the very fact that ethnic parties will not be in power, it is not sufficient: majority of the parties invited to join the Alliance are not ethnically indifferent, especially not according to the criteria of the voters of the other parties. Finally, none of them are multiethnic in the true sense of the word. Does that mean that without ethnic parties there will be no corruption? We have seen how it worked with Dodik. Will the administration be more efficient? We have seen how the Social Democratic Party worked in municipalities.

IVANIC THIRD TIME LUCKY: Of course, this is far from the thesis that ethnic parties are all made up of fine persons who deserve to be given a chance to reform. But they cannot be efficiently beaten without a minimum of political consensus of the parties which would join the Alliance. This consensus of the parties which have driven Tudjman and Milosevic off power, in B&H would have answer at least one question which was again the simplest of all problems for both Racan's and Kostunica's coalition. And that question is: what would the constitutional framework of B&H (which is nowadays looser than a federation and more cohesive that a confederation) have to be like in order to make all the parties in the Alliance (and outside it) believe that with little effort they would achieve exactly what they have always wished to have, despite the others. This very fact testifies that each party from the possible Alliance is closer to its "own" ethnic party against which it is joining the coalition than to the party "closest" to it but belonging to the other ethnic group.

That is why the Alliance for Changes, much more than an operational form of political union is in fact a pretext for inefficient policy of the international community. And that is the only reason why very soon the apocalyptic question may arise whether four million inhabitants of B&H exist for the sake of several thousand of foreign officials or vice versa. This international “Panta-Rei” in RS should establish the coalition (Alliance) of at least ten parties which would hardly make up a majority of 42 deputies. The foreigners are definitely aware that such a government is not operational because it does not operate anywhere, and apart from themselves it would please only those among deputies who believe that a raised hand in the parliament will in this season be worth much more than in any previous one. Such a government could be blackmailed, for example, even by the single deputy of the Party of Pensioners of RS who could in exchange ask for one thousand marks a month for the members of his social group. Or he will not raise his hand in the vote on the budget, for instance.

The other possibility would be if Mirko Sarovic took his presidential vote as soon as possible, nominate Ivanic to be the prime minister and if he formed the cabinet which SDS, PDP, the Socialists and DNS along with that single pensioners' deputy would vote in favour of. If the foreigners do not at least say “well, let's see that government of yours”, Ivanic will of course be smart enough not to allow to be the candidate for prime minister forever who cannot ensure 42 votes for himself not even three times. If even that does not pass, RS will be in serious trouble. That is why there is no need for Dodik who was already told that this will not pass to demand to be nominated the candidate for the new prime minister if Ivanic is not accepted. He will then simply continue having his government with his Banjac and Kremenovic and the likes of them with whom he has ambitiously already completed his draft budget for 2001.

A SMALL GOVERNMENT FOR A BIG TEMPTATION: If this government is elected after all, even as a compromise in exchange for which Dodik and the Alliance move to the Council of Ministers, the SDS and the foreigners will have a serious mutual test to pass. The former will have to do so much and say “yes” so many times that it is difficult to believe that it will end without serious internal problems which will finally reveal that the three-year life in the opposition has hidden that among them there are people who are sincerely in favour of reform and those who have subordinated political survival to the only goal to live to see the moment when Radovan (Karadzic) will appear from the forest riding a white horse.

If they get a stable government domineered by Ivanic and those members of SDS who decide to resemble him more than themselves, the foreigners will lament for the times of the one-to-one agreements they used to reach with Dodik in the past three years. Any government with Ivanic appearing as the legalistic variant of Kostunica on the left side of the Drina could set completely new standards for RS and the foreigners. They will either be forced to throw ministers or SDS deputies out of a window one by one right in front of Ivanic's eyes or they will have to carry out jobs with RS – from the story about the Hague to the final Constitutional formulation of B&H - through institutions. And they have shown that they like neither the one nor the other. They preferred to make deals with the Laktasi version of J.R.: you agree how much it costs and minor officials deal with laws.

In other words, one and the other variant of a government are a big challenge for all parties in RS. That is why the job of its establishment will not be easy regardless of assembly majority and the split of the international community over the question of SDS. That is why the well-informed Dodik should be asked whether he has already told his minister for money issues Novak Kondic to slowly start thinking about the draft budget for the year 2002.

Zeljko Cvijanovic

(AIM)