The Zagreb Summit Came and Went

AIM Zagreb, November 27, 2000

If the Zagreb Summit was marked, as expected, by finely tuned and carefully smoothened speeches, the first following days brought an altered course of events and disputes that shed a different light on what was actually said in Zagreb. Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, whose speech at the summit was the one that contained the most "Euro-scepticism," suddenly turned into an easy-going optimist who said that of all the countries in the region Yugoslavia had come closest to becoming a member of the European Union.

Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Racan reacted immediately, replying coldly that Kostunica's statement was very reminiscent of "the old Serbian rhetoric," and that the FRY would deserve membership in the family of European countries when it abandoned Milosevic's policies once and for all, of which, according to him, there was still no sign. Though it is not quite clear what "the Serbian rhetoric" was supposed to mean in this context -- for at least one decade this rhetoric has been all but pro-European -- one of Racan's intention could quite easily be detected. On the same occasion, namely, he also said that Croatia would apply for EU membership next year, which, in turn, immediately brought to mind the Tudjman era, and the hasty promises his diplomats loved to make.

In addition, the Racan statement has no relevance whatsoever because an application for EU membership can be submitted at any time – the former Croatian president was frequently criticized by the opposition for failing to do so - but it does not mean that the desired results will immediately follow. The statement, in fact, reveals the subdued dissatisfaction of some Croatian officials with the results of the summit. Racan's fellow partisan, Zdravko Tomac, said after the summit that he was not satisfied with the fact that after the signing of an agreement on association with the EU, Croatia was given the status of a "potential candidate," whereas Bulgaria and Romania already enjoy the status of "candidates."

In addition, many grudgingly criticized, albeit not too loudly, the fact that regional cooperation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia is supposed to be regulated by a firm agreement, whereas in the case of Central European countries or Hungary and Romania it is not so. Yet, at the same time, they seem to forget that the conflict was much deeper between the first group of countries. Thus local and EU officials are unanimous in their assessment that the Zagreb summit has marked an end to wars in the region. If new instances of intolerance emerge, they will be resolved at the negotiating table, and this is why Racan, at a meeting of CEI in Budapest, said that the participation of the Yugoslav delegation in the Zagreb summit was an important step forward.

According to him, the Yugoslav participation "has given an entirely new dimension to the relations of the countries in the region by ending a period of instability and crisis." From this it could be inferred that at least a portion of the dissatisfaction in Croatia was caused not so much by what was achieved at the summit itself as by internal political strife. The most important is the fact that Chirac's idea of last spring that the summit should be held in Zagreb was fully supported by Stipe Mesic, whereas Racan initially refused to even comment on it, leaving it to the inexperienced foreign minister, Tonino Picula, instead. That is to say that Mesic was better in getting the message, although Racan was also right in one thing.

Namely, the Zagreb summit was inspired by the idea of creating a specific sanitary corridor around Milosevic's Yugoslavia, but after his fall from power the basic aim of the summit and the Stability Pact had to be redefined. This is what Racan said shortly before the summit began, during a visit to Ankara, but without speaking openly or going into details. He was probably prevented from doing that because Chirac's initiative had caused a polarization on the Croatian political scene which, at that, was not working in Racan's favor. Vesna Pusic and her Croatian People's Party were on Mesic's side all along. The party believes that Croatia's joining the EU would finally put an end to Croatia's Balkan phobias. The other supporter was the Democratic Center of Mate Granic, whose only reserve was due to the little attention the Zagreb summit planned to place on the issue of the former Yugoslavia's succession.

On the other hand, the Croatian Democratic Union and a number of small rightist parties had been lobbying against the Zagreb summit for months. But against the meeting, which is even more important, were also Budisa's Social Liberals, Racan's chief partner in the government. Later, probably prompted by him, they abandoned their firm opposition, because Racan could not afford to find himself in the company of rightist parties, which at the end announced that they would fight the meeting even by mass protests in the streets of Zagreb. This turned out to be an idle threat, because on the day the summit started instead of thousands of protesters hardly five hundred political freaks gathered for demonstrations, singing, among other songs, one that went, "Oh, Lady of Sinj, take Stipe if you can and give us Franjo back again!" This is why Croatian Democratic Union officials did their best not to be seen in such inappropriate company.

This was probably the greatest defeat of the radical right since the change of government in Croatia, and it is a great relief for the country, because Croatia can no longer allow itself to be terrorized by numerous veterans' associations, which have become a caste unto themselves, and resort to blackmailing the government every week or so. As paradoxical as it may seem, however, the debacle of the rightists during the Zagreb Summit has created a void not beneficial to the country, because the passionate rightists are the only organized "Euro-sceptics" in Croatia. All others are so marginal that their questions about the inclusion of the country in European integration, among them the one mentioned at the beginning of this article and pertaining primarily to NATO and much less to the EU, are of little relevance.

The bickering over who will be the first to pass under the triumphal arc of EU membership reveals a rather low level of consciousness on the part of the local politicians, who obviously cannot understand that the key issue is how to put one's own country in order, after which it will become irrelevant not only who will be the first to enter European integration, but whether they will enter at all. This is particularly important when the level of economic development of a candidate for EU membership is in question, because the condition for acceptance is the prospective candidate's gross domestic product, which has to be at least one-half of that in the EU. For the time being, however, this requirement can only be met by Slovenia, whose GDP is 70 percent of the EU average. All the others are far below, including the most developed country, Croatia, which has managed to achieve about one-half of what Slovenia has.

These figures, however, only partly reflect the dramatic social circumstances in the region, which even in the more developed western part of the region border on mass poverty, even misery. The high goals proclaimed by European integration will have no purpose if they fail to provide for the elimination of these bleak social conditions. Yet, for the time being, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

Marinko Culic

(AIM)