Return of Yugoslavia to OUN and OSCE

AIM Pristina, November 14, 2000

Vojislav Kostunica's Yugoslavia is awarded by its reception in the OUN and OSCE eight years after Slobodan Milosevic's Yugoslavia was punished and its membership in these organisations suspended. And if eight years ago on the list of Milosevic's punishable mistakes there were "many things done and not done", there is only one "achievement" on Kostunica's list: Slobodan Milosevic is not at the head of Yugoslavia any more.

Former Yugoslav flag with the red communist star was taken down on the East River and the flag without the five-pointed star was hoisted. The first comments in Kosovo were the following: "A flag of a dead state was put down in order to hoist the flag of a non-existent state". But regardless of the irony and comments such as this one, the reception of Yugoslavia (the Albanians still call it the so-called Yugoslavia or what has been left of Yugoslavia) in the OUN and later in the OSCE was a step that did not cause enthusiasm among the Albanians. They assessed at once that this was a rash step. According to numerous local observers, this was "the biggest award for the new nationalistic leader in Belgrade". Others, more pessimistic ones, claim in their assessments that a part of the international community is "making amends" to Yugoslavia for the bombing campaign. Although the first man of the NATO Lord George Robertson declared that "no war reparations" would be paid to Yugoslavia, many in Kosovo consider the return of Yugoslavia to the OUN and OSCE to be the greatest possible reparation.

In their first statements which were as usually almost identical Albanian political parties stressed that "Kostunica should meet a few fundamental conditions, such as liberation of Albanian prisoners held in prisons in Serbia, clarification of the destiny of disappeared persons, paying reparations and especially cooperation with the Hague Tribunal for war crimes". None of these conditions has been met. Kostunica has won with a single "application" in writing...

The Democratic League of Kosovo (DSK), perhaps in order to pacify the public, through its vice president Kol Berisha, expressed the stand that this was "after all just a credit of the international community the interest for which will be paid dearly by Kostunica". According to him, it is obvious practically at first glance that it is a carrot that might very quickly turn into a stick across Kostunica's back. He even "reassured" sympathisers of his party (which had won 58 per cent of the votes in local elections) not to be afraid of the changes in Belgrade nor the processes that are taking place around Belgrade.

The rival of DSK, Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK) of the former political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) Hashim Thaci estimated that reception of Yugoslavia in the OUN and OSCE was too hasty. Barhul Mahmuti, representative for foreign policy of this party stated that "changes in Serbia were sufficient for some parts of the international community to focus engagement of political energy on Belgrade". According to him, the trail is blazed by those who have always been the allies of Serbia. This party declared that it would engage in finding allies who would fight for independence of Kosovo. Until the definite solution of its political status is found, according to DPK, Kosovo should have a special status in all international structures.

In any case, reception of Yugoslavia in OUN "activated" political and non-political protagonists, analysts and independent observers in Kosovo who entered into a series of speculations, evaluations and ironic approaches to this topic. Some of them established that "the world proved to be irresponsible", others said that "this does not concern Kosovo, because it is a separate entity", some stated the opinion that this would nevertheless "aggravate the process of negotiations on the final status of Kosovo".

Whether this was a coincidence or not, on the day when Yugoslavia was received in grand style in the OUN, members of Independent International Commission in Kosovo in Pristina and their president Richard Goldstone explained the details of their proposal of the idea on "conditional independence of Kosovo". This was the first proposal of an international commission for which "independence of Kosovo" was not a taboo topic. However, some Albanian political representatives stated that "open discussions on the possibility of winning independence of Kosovo" have played the role of a specific smoke curtain behind which other games were played which were aimed at sanctioning the current developments". It is known that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 prescribes the status of Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation. Although it may be just formally, this Resolution recognises Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo, and this is more than unacceptable for Albanian representatives.

They are especially afraid of the role the Americans may play in reception of Yugoslavia in the OUN. This issue was urged by "Balkan bulldozer" Richard Holbrooke who was the one that just two months ago while Milosevic was still in power in Belgrade demanded that Yugoslav flag be taken down from in front of the OUN building. Now it was Holbrooke again who pushed the question of reception of FRY forward just a few days after he had come back from his tour of South-Eastern Europe. American diplomats in Pristina have promised that there would be no changes in their policy towards Kosovo and that independence remains one of the possibilities which should be decided by the peoples in the region. However, there are comments here that these statements are coming from an administration whose term in office will end in about a couple of months...

Albanian political representatives appear as if they had changed their demands. Referring to the highly estimated just completed local elections, they persist in accelerating scheduling of general elections. According to them, ruling structures with special legitimacy would result from these elections. They also demand a temporary constitution and operation of Kosovo as a special entity. In this way realistic possibilities for negotiations on the definite status of Kosovo would be created, which certainly has to be separated from Yugoslavia, according to them. They are nevertheless waiting and attentively following the developments in the Republic of Montenegro and defining the relations of this Republic with Serbia. Should Montenegro decide its destiny by a referendum, they wonder who could possibly ban Kosovo to that too? However, it is clear to the Albanians that "acclamation in the Security Council and in OUN General Assembly for the reception of Yugoslavia cannot be repeated when the destiny of Kosovo is concerned”.

In any case, putting the question of the final status of Kosovo on the agenda and more frequent mentioning (with the gloves off) of the possibility of its independence arouses hope in the Albanians that “any aspiration to preserve even symbolic sovereignty of Yugoslavia over Kosovo would be yet another adventure of the international community and its so far colossal investment for the sake of peace in Kosovo”. Many local analysts believe that time is already passing of “Western-European nostalgia for Tito's Yugoslavia” which according to them cannot be repeated

AIM Pristina

Besnik BALA