Politics and Police

The Case of Rade Markovic

The head of the Serbian Interior Ministry's State Security Service is the current figura dramatis of Serbian politics.

AIM Belgrade, November 9, 2000

"The transitional government will not operate until Markovic steps down," says Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party and one of the leaders of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). This stance is shared by the Serbian vice premier and senior official of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Spasoje Krunic, whose party was the one that originally made this demand. Markovic, however, has neither resigned nor been dismissed. His position is the main topic of sessions of the highest state officials. A meeting between Krunic and the Serbian vice premier from the DOS, Nebojsa Covic, with Serbian Premier Milomir Minic from the Socialist Party of Serbia, failed to end the cabinet crisis. The Socialists would not yield in the case of State Security.

Their determination wasn't shaken even when a document was circulated in Belgrade on Oct. 21 revealing the first concrete lead on the organizers or at least witnesses to the assassination of Slavko Curuvija, the owner and publisher of the Dnevni Telegraf daily, which took place on April 11, 1999. The document, consisting of two sheets of paper, entitled "A Report on Clandestine Surveillance of Curan," revealed that State Security agents were tracking Curuvija on the day he was murdered and that they were withdrawn several minutes before the hitmen shot him. An accompanying note showed that Rade Markovic had ordered Milan Radonjic, the head of the Belgrade center of the Serbian State Security Service, to organize surveillance and that the two of them had withdrawn the agents "so that they would not see the assassins." Although the police neither confirmed nor denied the authenticity of the document, witnesses who were quoted in it as Curuvija's "contacts" have confirmed that the notes on what Curuvija and they had been doing that day fully corresponded to what actually happened.

The appearance of the document is, of course, part of the pressure by the DOS and the Renewal Movement aimed at making Markovic step down, but it is not the reason why Markovic's dismissal has been asked for. The head of the State Security Service, namely, is the symbol of everything the Slobodan Milosevic regime stood for -- from widespread crime, unsolved murders, to direct misuse of the the Service in everyday life.

Who, actually, is Rade Markovic?

He began his career as a police officer in 1970, and his first appointment was in the Second Department, in charge of dealing with aggravated robberies. During Milosevic's ascent, he served as head of the Second Department for Suppressing Crime of the Belgrade police. From there he was transferred to Surcin airport, where he worked as commander of the police station, but soon afterwards he became the head of the Belgrade police. The Belgrade BINA news agency reported on Oct. 2, 1992, that Markovic was involved in extortion. Though the police denied this ("We have no proof that Mr. Markovic is involved in extortion or other crimes."), he was soon dismissed from the post. His comeback was glamorous: after the June 3, 1993, demonstrations he participated in the arrest of Vuk and Danica Draskovic. When Danica asked to be protected from police brutality he slapped her. In August 1993, he was appointed deputy minister of the interior. Following the assassination of Serbian acting interior minister Radovan "Badza" Stojicic on April 11, 1997, he became the head of the Serbian Interior Ministry's public security service, having the rank of lieutenant general, and after the sacking of Jovica Stanisic, on Oct. 27, 1998, succeeded him as head of the Serbian State Security Service.

Two years have elapsed since. Much like his appointment was a precedent -- it was the first time that an official of the public security became the head of the secret service -- he was also the only holder of this office to ever give a televised interview (in October, 2000). His appointment was generally believed to be yet another success in the Yugoslav Left's takeover of important offices, whereas his interview was seen as a desperate attempt at convincing the public that the forces of the former regime were not defeated and could well adapt to the newly-created circumstances.

What exactly has the service done while under his command can be inferred only from some external indicators. Professional and unsolved assassinations came one after another in quick succession, Yugoslav Left top officials such as Goran Matic and Ivan Markovic were fed material for harangues against Milosevic's opponents, blasting them as spies and terrorists, the nomenklatura kept amassing wealth from all sorts of illegal activities... There was also the case of the truck that on the Ibarska Magistrala highway on Oct. 3, 1999, was used for the assassination attempt on Vuk Draskovic, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement (on the occasion three bodyguards were killed, as well as the director of the Belgrade Service for Construction Lots, Veselin Boskovic). The truck was property of the State Security Service and its driver was never found. As mentioned earlier, Markovic was in charge at the time Curuvija was under surveillance and was killed.

Maybe the best record of his two-year term of office was offered by Markovic himself at a meeting of the three Serbian co-ministers at the Interior Ministry. According to a facsimile of a memo to the Serbian premier and his deputies carried by the Blic daily, during a debate on his resignation and the involvement of certain officials of the service in the murder of Slavko Curuvija, the head of the State Security Service said that the media had launched a campaign against him and that his family was having a hard time because of that. He asked to be protected through the release of truthful information to the public. Otherwise, Markovic added, he would have to take steps as "a man who has has an impressive influence in this city, and numerous acquaintances in Belgrade's underworld." They are indebted to him not because of favors he did to them, but because of his professional reputation. Many of them have already called and said: "Boss, just tell us whose ass we're supposed to kick... don't tell me we're doing things like that now?"

Probably only Markovic can explain how come he is receiving calls from people who should be his "natural adversaries," what kind of "reputation" he could possibly enjoy with such people, and why they are ready to act the minute he tells them that someone is "bothering" him? His words spoken in front of the three co-ministers cannot be understood in any other way but as an open threat, strongly backed by the series of unsolved murders.

It is impossible for any secret police head to remain at his post after being as exposed to the public as Markovic. Why then is the Socialist Party of Serbia insisting that he remain there, even at the cost of provoking an open cabinet crisis? There are several possible answers to that. First of all, this could be due to attempts to buy time so that documents implicating the former regime could be destroyed. On the other hand, Djindjic and some others believe it could be possible that Markovic is still informing Milosevic, and, as such, is one of his pillars of support. Others still believe that at work here are attempts by the former regime to cause a deep crisis, undermine the DOS, postpone early elections for the Serbian Legislature set for Dec. 23, and after consolidating its forces, try to regain power. In any case, the demands that Markovic step down could also be due to attempts to demonstrate that Serbia after Sept. 24 and Oct. 5 is no longer the same, and to appease that part of the public that is not pleased with the speed changes are progressing at. The intention to further demoralize the forces of the former regime ahead of elections and force them to make additional concessions could also be at issue.

It has to be noted, however, that in the wake of Oct. 5, despite their initial stalling and opposition, the Socialists have ultimately yielded to all DOS pressures, except in the case of Markovic. Well-informed observers suggest that this has mostly to do with relations inside the DOS coalition. Namely, certain coalition members believe that hasty dismissals in the police, which is to say in the security service as well, could prove more dangerous than leaving the discredited officials in office until the new Serbian Legislature and government are former after the Dec. 23 vote. Their basic fear is due to a possibility that, otherwise, the leading and very sensitive positions in the Service could be taken by people who would offer various forms of support to their parties and political leaders during the election campaign, and even more after the elections, when the DOS falls apart as will unavoidably happen.

They also believe that hasty personnel changes in the interim period could provoke the ultimate collapse of the seriously damaged institutions in Serbia and lead to anarchy with devastating consequences. This angle should probably be used to view statements in which Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica said that he had not requested the resignations of leading officials of the army and police.

With due respect to these reasons, one thing should be kept in mind -- the State Security Service as it is cannot be reformed. It is a system that has reached the final stage of a terminal cancer, that has turned into its opposite, and that not even the best qualified and most honest people can change it from within. It is better to freeze its activities entirely than try to separate such an institution from the illegal actions that has become its second, true nature. The only thing that can be done is to rebuild the State Security Service, as part of the Interior Ministry, from scratch, as a modern service in line with international standards. But before that happens, Markovic and his ilk will have to take a fall.

Philip Scwarm

(AIM)