Election Results in Republika Srpska

Bitter Champagne for the Serb Democrats

The Serb Democratic Party will now have to meet foreigners' rigorous criteria, whereas Ivanic will become a new media star, meaning a man who travels around the world, smiles to foreign politicians and attracts money. In short, he will have to do all that which Dodik has been doing thus far with such joy and elation.

AIM Banja Luka, Nov. 12, 2000

The convincing victory of the Serb Democratic Party in general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina has led to a situation psychologically analogous to the one preceding the 1992 war there. Namely, back then many were convinced that war was imminent, but it did not help them much because they did not know what the war was all about. Eight years later, many were aware that the Serb Democrats would utterly defeat Milorad Dodik, but no one knew what practical implications the victory would have. The outcome of the election, however, means that all that has been attained by "reformers," led by Milorad Dodik and decisively supported by foreign money and force, will have, with some luck, to undergo a very close scrutiny.

The question of where the mistake lies is even more dramatic given the fact that Dragan Kalinic's people won the elections with one hand tied behind their back: not a single important message was stated in the campaign, no radical gesture was made, no conflicting situations were created. All the party's efforts were focused on letting voters know that the Serb Democrats were still there and avoiding angering the foreigners who were just waiting for them to take one wrong step to ban them and annul their votes.

THE DEFEAT OF FOREIGNERS: In the afternoon of Nov. 13, when this article was being written and when the elections were not yet officially finished, the result of these efforts was almost completely clear: the Serb Democratic Party had won a landslide victory. At that point the Kalinic party had an overwhelming majority in the Serb contingent in the B-H Parliament, while in elections for the RS assembly it was still struggling, albeit with slim chances, to obtain an absolute majority. At the same time its presidential candidate, Mirko Sarovic, was well on the way to securing an absolute majority in the first round of vote counting and preventing his rival, Milorad Dodik, from qualifying for a round of counting of preferential votes, in which the incumbent premier saw his chance.

The remaining votes, among which are ballots cast by Croat and Bosniak refugees, are yet to be counted. But since the refugee turnout, according to unofficial reports, appears to have been below 50 percent, Dodik's chances are even further reduced. After that it will be up to the foreigners to recognize the election results, void them or condition the Serb Democrats' victory, but in any of these cases they will have to admit that the policies they have pursued for years in Republika Srpska have failed.

Meanwhile, despite the fact that, because of the electoral system and the manner of vote counting in Republika Srpska, it is hard to come up with a representative sample even after 250,000 ballots have been processed, champagne was served at the Serb Democrats' camp, and Dodik's Party of Independent Social Democrats conceded defeat in the vote for the RS assembly and the B-H parliament, believing that in the race for RS president they have not yet lost all their chances.

HAVE THE NATIONALISTS WON?: Of course. Analyses, such as one made by Branko Neskovic, an official of the Dodik party, have been made public already. Neskovic has discovered that the mistake lies with the voters, and said that "the electorate is not yet politically mature," whereas James Lion attributed the expected outcome of the elections several days prior to the vote to "the mentality and ways of the Serbs." The story on the Serbs as congenital nationalists, however, though likely to be widely exploited, this time around will not hold water.

First of all, while pondering how to procure Vojislav Kostunica's support, Dodik showed he had learned little from Kostunica's campaign. There is no way, for example, for you to smile at half-starved people from posters on every corner and ask them to vote for you while simultaneously acting arrogantly as if you had elected yourself long ago.

In short, Dodik's campaign was one becoming of a true Balkan ruler: a lot of road opening coupled with stories of how he had preserved a strong state despite the weak population, which actually boiled down to attempts to convince the voters that they are living much better than they really are. This is why Dodik did not lose the elections, as he probably believes, because of the national question, but because of his trump card -- the economy, and because of corruption and arrogance.

But his defeat is not yet final: judging by initial results he is also highly likely to lose in the race for the second position in the assembly, against Mladen Ivanic and his Party of Democratic Progress. This defeat could prove much more embarrassing for Dodik than the one he experienced in vying for power with the Serb Democrats. Why is that?, you might ask.

Because the Serb Democratic Party will have to strive to meet the excessively rigorous criteria of the foreigners for a long time to come, whereas Ivanic will become a new reform-minded media star, that is, a man who travels around the world, smiles to foreign politicians and attracts money, in short, a person who does all that which Dodik has been doing so far with much joy and elation.

QUESTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS: The foreigners, however, will not renounce the defeated Dodik so easily either. Of course, the reason is not so much their love of Dodik as it is their love of themselves. If Dodik finally falls, the primary job of the Serb Democrats and Ivanic would be to carry out a probe into his bills and papers, where they are likely to discover a lot. And then every foreigner on service in Bosnia would have to explain to his/her boss the reasons for spending taxpayers' money on a presumptuous Balkan looser. This is why Dodik's downfall will be the downfall of international policies in Bosnia as well: local puppet politicians have long been outdated.

Because of this the drama of vote counting will be followed by the drama of inaugurating the new authorities. If the Serb Democratic Party wins the right to form the government, alone or with Zivko Radisic's Socialists who have barely made it through the election, this could mean anything except the fact that it would indeed happen. If, for instance, Sarovic, if he wins, appoints Kalinic as premier designate, there are plenty of reasons to believe that Wolfgang Petritsch would feel as if had grown donkey's ears. This is why after the counting of the votes ends, provided its outcome is favorable for the Serb Democrats as expected, the party will face its first major test.

Namely, the party will go back to January 1998, when Momcilo Krajisnik and Aleksa Buha arrogantly dismissed Ivanic. This time around only Ivanic can serve as a bridge between the foreigners and the Serb Democratic Party: Ivanic will rule on their behalf, and the party will be somewhere nearby, patiently assuring the foreigners that they are tamer than ever. Their problem, therefore, is whether they will be able to survive their victory.

First of all, their victory has made many people angry. Secondly -- and we are being optimistic here -- on their way to (divided) power, Petritsch will be waiting for them to ask them a number of yes/no questions. One of them, for instance, will concern the Hague Tribunal. If they fail to respond, Lion and the ICG will tell Petritsch: "We told you that they have to be destroyed, didn't we?" and he will be at a loss, unable to reply as convincingly as two weeks ago.

TASTE & INTELLIGENCE: All this is to say that many in the Serb Democratic Party will regret winning the elections, but now there is no way out of that. Because they have been offered an opportunity to reform themselves, which in their case means making so forceful a U-turn that a number of them could find themselves splayed out on the ground. Furthermore, divisions within, or even the dissolution of, the party, which is under enormous tensions, should not be ruled out either.

On the other hand, there is Ivanic to be taken into account, probably the future person No. 1 in Republika Srpska, stronger than in 1998 by as many times as the number of his current representatives in the assembly compared to two years ago. What will happen, for instance, if he demonstrates a desire to make a government of experts that would be backed by all parties, even Dodik's one? Kalinic would have to bow to this and apologize to his party associates for failing to install any one of them in ministerial office. Dodik would have to do the same, to save himself and his corrupt cronies.

All this means only two things: the elections have ended and the results are in sight, but nothing is yet finished. Secondly, the difficulties surrounding the forming of the government do not necessarily mean that the government will be stable. This is but the first challenge awaiting Republika Srpska in the next year, when all the issues will be placed on the table, and among them the following one: should Republika Srpska survive at all? This is why, by being able to detect a trace of bitterness in the champagne that now flows freely at the offices of the Serb Democratic Party, each party official will demonstrate not only his refined taste, but a refined intelligence as well.

Zeljko Cvijanovic

(AIM Banja Luka)