Went Hunting for Mesic, Caught Budua

Zagreb Nov 4, 2000

(AIM Zagreb, October 30, 2000)

A debate on amendments to the Croatian Constitution, which over the past Several weeks has raised much dust - a certain amount of which was obviously intended to obfuscate the issue - is nonetheless nearing its end. The Constitutional Committee of the Croatian Parliament that was authorized to prepare the final version of the proposal before it is sent to Parliament for debate and adoption, held its last session. The meeting's chief topic should have been the objections and suggestions of Croatian President Stjepan Mesic, but events took an unexpected course.

All in all, the gap created in the debate so far between Mesic and Prime Minister Ivica Racan, who was successfully defended by the leader of the rightist liberals, the second strongest party inside the ruling coalition, Drazen Budisa, has been bridged. At the same time, however, a gap, maybe even an abyss, has been created between Budisa on one side and Mesic and Racan on the other, and the brunt of the conflict shifted from the Mesic-Racan dispute to a dispute between Racan and Budisa. The latter could have even more devastating consequences because it might end in a breakup of the ruling six-party coalition (to which Mesic formally does not belong) and subsequent early elections.

But let us first explain how the differences between Mesic and Racan were patched up. It came about much easier than initially expected. The afore-mentioned constitutional committee at its latest session rejected some of Mesic's strongest demands such as for the president to retain the title of the head of state or something similar, the right to propose justices of the Constitutional Court and the governor of the National Bank, to appoint the heads of all military and civilian secret services and supervise their operations. These demands were so excessive, even outrageous, that it was immediately clear that Mesic was asking for more in order to get what he really wanted. And this is what he got in the end.

Thus it appeared that after the huge storm that put two key figures in the New Croatian government, Mesic and Racan, at odds, everything will go back to where it started. This is to say that the long-time principle according to which Croatia has a relatively strong cabinet, accountable to the Parliament, and a relatively weak president who, being elected by direct vote, will wield significant power in both internal and foreign affairs was expected to retain its importance. This would have indeed happened had it not been for Budisa and his Croatian Social Liberal Party who deprived this tense political drama of its expected happy ending. Though they have recently been fiercely accusing both Mesic and the smaller parties inside the ruling six of destroying the unity of the parties in power, the Liberals have once more shown with an obviousness that would stand even the most thorough scrutiny that they are responsible for what they are charging others.

Together with the Croatian Democratic Union they strongly opposed a proposal sent to the Constitutional Committee for empowering the Croatian president to disband the Parliament and call early elections if urged to do so by the cabinet. Instead of this, the Croatian Democratic Union and the Croatian Social Liberal Party came forth with the idea that in the event the cabinet resigned, the president should propose a new prime minister designate within fifteen days, and that the same could be done by one-fifth of MPs. In the case of two proposals, the president's choice would first be put to a vote, and if rejected, the MPs' proposal would follow suit. Only if this proposal was also rejected would early elections be called.

Though Budisa has of late strongly opposed a "new shuffling of cards," that is, creation of new alliances in the Parliament, his proposal enables exactly this to take place, and makes it possible for the Social Liberals and the Croatian Democratic Union to create a strong bloc and attain a relative, though not an absolute, majority in the Parliament. This would suffice to block a number of decisions made by the Parliament, mostly those requiring a two-thirds majority, such as is needed, for instance, for changes to the constitution on which a final decision should be reached next month.

This is why it is now up to new, maybe even dramatic, intra-party agreements to eliminate the danger of the ruling six-member coalition breaking up over the issue of constitutional changes. The first statements from the two camps intimate that such an outcome should well be expected, and the Social Liberals provocatively claim that the government of the six has persevered due exclusively to their tolerance. On the other hand, Racan's Social Democrats are for the first time pointing their finger at the Budisa party as the one to blame for obstructing the government. So far, such accusations were hurled only at smaller coalition members. They add that if no other solution is found they would call early elections in which the Liberals would pay dearly for destroying the coalition.

Despite this heavy verbal shelling there is a realistic possibility that Racan and Budisa could reach a compromise at the last moment after having realized that early elections, held less than a year after the regular vote, would ultimately be of disservice to all. This compromise, as a result of bitter and whimsical bickering, however, can hardly comfort either side. The attitude of the six-member coalition indicates that they are not too comfortable with their own constitutional proclamations, and that their belief in the principles of parliamentarism and separation of power that should become part of the constitution should be subject to reasonable suspicion.

This is even more so given that the same coalition, which has been having Great difficulties with the Croatian constitution, intervened swiftly when the constitutional order of the neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina was in question. Last week the Croatian government sent a protest note to the OSCE over new rules to be implemented during the upcoming parliamentary elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and according to which Croatian representatives in the federal Chamber of Nations will be elected by Bosniak voters as well. Although the note was written in the mildest possible language and contains a well-founded objection (as to why the same rule does not apply to Republika Srpska as well), international representatives will probably take it as a sign that official Zagreb is actually not adhering to the principles of multi-ethnicity.

The note from Zagreb - from which Mesic skillfully distanced himself by saying that it involved an internal matter of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas Budisa took an opposite stand and went even a step further than the government by sending his envoy to a so-called Croatian assembly in Novi Travnik - is openly working in favor of nationalist parties, in this case the Croatian Democratic Union, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus the Racan government has led itself into an embarrassing situation in which it is being accused by opposition parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina otherwise close to it of interfering in this country's internal matters. Malicious intent could even add to this objection by concluding that those who know not how to put their own house in order, should not snoop and nag around their neighborhood.

Marinko Culic

(AIM Zagreb)