Serbian Police: Autopsy Results

Transformation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia into a normal and modern police should begin by radical investigation of all former abuses and criminal acts, by dismantling of mechanisms which served solely for preservation of power of the former regime, and not the citizens. If for no other reason, so no new authorities ever yield to the temptation

AIM Podgorica, October 16, 2000 (By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

Immediately after the big overthrow of the regime on October 5, president of Democratic Alternative (DA) and one of the leaders of Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) Nebojsa Covic, to the question whose the police was, answered: "Everyone's and none's". A couple of days after that, when the level of adrenaline in the streets began to drop and negotiations on early elections in Serbia proceeded, president of Democratic Party (DS) and, according to general judgement, the central figure in DOS, Zoran Djindjic declared that at the moment the police was controlling itself. What he actually meant it is hard to tell: after dramatic events in Belgrade streets and the forced resignation of the minister of internal affairs in the government of Serbia Vlajko Stojiljkovic, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) seems to exist just formally. The highest officials in one of the pillars of the regime of former president of FR Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, are sitting tight, silent as the grave. As it is possible to learn while they are discharging just the minimum of routine jobs, they are closely following the political developments and waiting: what will happen when the new transitional Serbian government is established and what will happen after the early elections scheduled for December 23. Only one thing is certain: the police is not an instrument any more used for preservation in power

"We have always known who was in favour of beating and who wasn't", says a policeman, insisting on anonymity. "However, after the latest elections, nobody knew anything any more. Nobody like policemen knows what the disposition of the people is like - how can you beat up half of Serbia, how can you arrest future ministers? And for whom? Certainly not for those whose truckloads with which they are making millions you escort for meagre 200 marks of monthly salary, and who while you are bleeding in Kosovo, construct villas and Bambilands?"

Organised as Pretorian guards of the former regime, MUP of Serbia has essentially become a victim of its perversity and loss of every feeling for reality. Depending on distribution of forces and interests of lobbies at the very top of the former regime, members of public security service (policemen) in uniforms arrested petty smugglers of petrol and cigarettes or peacefully passed by them; when ordered they waged war in Kosovo or arrested children in T-shirts of Otpor (Resistance) movement; during their working hours they checked the strength of their rubber batons against the backs of peaceful protesters, and some of them, after work, were bodyguards of notorious criminals. State security service - which is in itself more than mysterious – along with everything listed, at a higher level completely grew into a political and business service of the ruling oligarchy with the main task to present reality according to their wishes. Nobody, of course, claims that such police did not arrest criminals it dared arrest. The truth is that it has simply decayed together with the regime itself.

"The contacts with our connections in the police was very important", said in his interview for Belgrade Vreme weekly Velimir Velja Ilic, mayor of Cacak, who had led his co-citizens on October 5 to Belgrade to defend the election will of the citizens. "We had firm guarantees that they would not shoot, but also the information that they would come against us at about half past three".

These words testify to what extent the apparently firm police monolith tumbled down by itself. More precisely: to what extent various persons from MUP of Serbia, who were until recently ready to beat and arrest people at just a wink from some of Milosevic's cronies realised that their power was on the wane, even if they had managed to introduce dictatorship or cause bloodshed. Because in case of dictatorship, the police would have had to turn into a sort of occupation army with everything that this implied and what most of its members had not been prepared to be. In case of bloodshed, MUP would not have been anything else but one of the warring militias in conflict in which there would not have been either a frontline or civilians, in which one's own life or family would not have been untouchable, and with all the experience from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the policemen could not have agreed to it.

This was the context in which on October 5, the chain of command broke and the police became passive. Partly because of conscience, partly because of common sense and calculation, a significant number of policemen - ordinary and officers - sabotaged orders to attack the citizens. The atmosphere of being witness to the last waltz of a regime which was completely unmasked in its dilapidation seized them all - from generals to the last patrolman on the beat. It was clear that apart from those who believed in invincibility of Milosevic there were much more of those who had established contacts with the leaders from DOS, informed them, offered guarantees, ensuring in this way their careers or simply having decided to be completely inactive - in every sense of the word.

"I cannot say that among us, among friends, we had not vowed that at no price would we order shooting at the people", says the already mentioned policeman. "But I cannot say either that I have heard of anyone protesting in the stations, refused to obey superiors or raised some kind of rebellion. We all played dumb: we were allegedly just doing our jobs, allegedly not interested in politics. It was clear, however, that after September 24, a new era has begun and that for as long as things did not settle down, a man had to be cautious and wise".

What was exactly happening in these critical October days in the police and who were the main protagonists will have to be revealed slowly and gradually. It is evident that MUP as Milosevic's weapon completely failed on that "D-Day": Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ) the members of which in plain clothes heartlessly beat up the demonstrators during the citizens' protest in 1996/97 practically fell apart; Special Units of the Police (PJP) whose duty was to intervene in demonstrations did not function either; one of the ill-famed police stations in Belgrade in Majke Jevrosime street, where until just a month ago members of Otpor were taken when arrested because of their black T-shirts with a fist drawn on them, was occupied by protesters who took the weapons from it, and the policemen who were in the building barely avoided lynch...

The listed examples refer to public security, or the members of MUP who the citizens had often the opportunity to see in cordons, armed, with batons and bullet-proof vests. With the change of political climate, reconstruction and reform of this part of MUP of Serbia should not be a serious problem; they are essentially ordinary people whose service was so many times abused by the former regime...

On October 5, the Special Operation Unit (SJO) also had its public promotion in Belgrade; known to the public as the "Red Berets" or "Frankyists" who got their names from their founder Franko Simatovic Frenky. There were many of them in the streets and they did nothing. Their "fame", however, is no news: to be extremely mild and euphemistic, one should say that they carried out all kinds of “black” operations on all battlefields in former Yugoslavia and in Serbia. According to interpretations of ones, their presence in American jeeps and with expensive equipment in Belgrade streets was the result of resorting to the very last Milosevic's reserve and then its refusing obedience and expressing solidarity with the citizens. Others, serious connoisseurs of this field, believe that this was simply a demonstration of their presence and force, for the information of all interested parties, for example, as a recommendation of their services to the new authorities along with the warning to them to be careful where they were poking their nose.

“The truth is that state security has been shattered after Jovica Stanisic (its head from 1991 until 1998) had been relieved of duty and that it was not what it used to be”, says the man from the police. “Not only nomination of Rade Markovic for the head but also all the personnel in the past years have been dictated by JUL. Although at the time of Stanisic it was not much better, there was some order and things were done; after him – they were with their heads in JULish clouds and up to their necks in JULish business deals. There were all kinds of people, there was no loyalty to anybody or anything, all they cared for was themselves. I don't believe they didn't or didn't dare tell Milosevic true information. These men, except for a few fanatics and a few honourable professionals were concerned only about the interests of their patrons who had brought them to their posts and about their own butts. But it won't be easy to get rid of them – they know too much and have connections all over the place. Nothing is what it seems to be over here”.

Indeed, dismantling and re-introducing order in the State Security Service will be the most difficult and the key task in transformation of MUP of Serbia into a normal and modern police. It is not just a question of various delicate issues that accompany every secret police such as dossiers of the citizens and wiretapping, but primarily of the fact that the Service has in the past ten years metastasised into the main lever of extra-institutional power and political action – from scheming in political parties, creating “cases” with which the spokesmen of Yugoslav Left (JUL) Goran Matic and Ivan Markovic intimidated the public, to securing “business” interests of various lobbies of the former regime.

Therefore when MUP of Serbia is concerned, its reform should begin with a radical investigation of all abuses and criminal acts, dismantling of all police mechanisms which served solely for preservation of the former regime and not the citizens. If for no other reason, at least so the new regime does not fall into temptation.

Philip Schwarm

(AIM)