Republika Srpska Politicians and Milosevic

Milosevic's demise is a final chance for political parties in Republika Srpska to start pursuing policies instead of lining up in front of foreigners to prove how many times they publicly criticized and opposed 'Sloba Nazionale.'

AIM Banja Luka, October 7, 2000

Milosevic? Of course we know the man, he's Savo, the best soccer player in Republika Srpska! This is how all political parties in Republika Srpska will ultimately respond to the only drama in the last 15 years in Belgrade that had a happy ending. This will also be the response of those who first heard of Savo Milosevic when last Wednesday wearing an Otpor T-shirt he played soccer at downtown Belgrade Terazije Square, and of those who little earlier stopped following Savo's somewhat more renowned namesake who on Thursday finally lost his captain's band. Meanwhile, all statements such as, “The people are the highest institution and we never questioned their will,” (Zivko Radisic), “The will of the people has finally triumphed,” (Milorad Dodik), or “We oppose the use of force against the people, the use of violence, army and the police, but we also oppose setting the FRY Parliament on fire,” (Mirko Sarovic), all these statements that no matter how opposed they might seem are but rhetorical figures preceding Milosevic's final departure into oblivion. This is why the loudest disputes that will take place in Republika Srpska will boil down to senseless babbling about who was the first to say no to him. It is a convenient arena for those whose best trade are intrigues, revenge and pseudo-moralizing, but not for those intent of dealing with politics. Apart from that, Milosevic will only occasionally appear in Republika Srpska in Zivko Radisic's sentimental memories of a great love that would, each time, be accompanied by an appropriate denial.

BACK TO ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE: The next stage in relations between Serbia and Republika Srpska will be to put things back in the right place: Banja Luka, much like Podgorica, will again assume its true size, overblown in the past two years due to the lack of democracy and money in Belgrade. In other words, Belgrade émigrés would gradually leave Banja Luka and on their way home, at the Raca border crossing, would meet political, cultural and ideological concepts traveling the other direction. Those among the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks who believe that a bit of order, peace and money in Serbia would not damage Bosnia either would see this as no cause for alarm. After all, if it weren't for the democratic wave that came from Serbia during the 1996/97 winter demonstrations, there would have been no revolution by Biljana Plavsic, which finally forced the Serb Democratic Party to step down. Those, on the other hand, who see Bosnia's happier future only in a ruined Serbia and who, finding on the Drina's right bank only nationalists and Milosevics, are presenting to foreigners their own nationalism as political correctness, have every reason to be desperate over the change in Belgrade. The change on Republika Srpska's political scene, however, will be radical. RS political parties will once and for all abandon the perverse dichotomy of basing all their activities on being close to or firmly opposing Milosevic. This is why it is not an exaggeration to say that Milosevic's stepping down has enabled the parties in Republika Srpska to start pursuing true policies, instead of lining up before foreigners to show them proof of how often they publicly criticized 'Sloba Nazionale.' In other words, change in Serbia will create room for parties with better infrastructure, serious projects and convincing ideas which, after all, is the ongoing trend.

THE POSING-IN-FRONT-OF-THE-CAMERAS STAGE: There are two dominant stands in Banja Luka on how the changes in Serbia are going to influence Republika Srpska. The first is adhered to by Biljana Plavsic and Milorad Dodik, who believe that the taking of power by democratic forces in Belgrade will improve their rating among voters. This is entirely wrong for two reasons. Firstly, for at least half a decade Milosevic has been considered far less important among voters in Republika Srpska than in Republika Srpska political parties. Secondly, it is a big question whether voters in Republika Srpska, given that much like voters in general they do not remember much, will identify Milosevic with the Serb Democratic Party which has been in opposition for three years now, or Dodik and Plavsic, who are in power, and who, in addition to having good relations with foreigners, have demonstrated all the shortcomings of the Milosevic regime: corruption, an undemocratic attitude, destruction of state institutions. The other dominant stand is that of the Serb Democratic Party, which believes that with Milosevic gone, the foreigners will no longer have any reason for so obstinately supporting Dodik just because he is against Milosevic. This is not far from the truth, but certainly is not the whole truth. In Republika Srpska Dodik was not only Milosevic's foe, but also a man who did all the jobs the foreigners themselves could not without abandoning their firm adherence to political correctness and democratic procedure. In other words, Dodik was entrusted with pushing through the assembly and other democratic institutions all that which without him could not have been achieved. This is why most voters in Republika Srpska see him as a hated drill sergeant, a go-between between the foreign colonels and the domestic privates on the political scene.

The next stage in relations between RS politicians and new officials in Serbia will consist of posing for the cameras. That was the only reason why Dodik pushed through the assembly a declaration supporting the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). That was the only reason why Radisic was the first publicly to recall the issue of diplomatic relations and special ties with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That was why Biljana Plavsic was to first to rush to Belgrade and congratulate Vojislav Kostunica, the new president of Yugoslavia, in the hope that voters will know how to repay her for this gesture. But the complexity of the situation does not end here. First of all, no party in Republika Srpska will receive the support of the DOS, this opposition bloc being a mixture of various parties and groups united against Milosevic. Thus Kostunica has the greatest personal sympathy for Predrag Radic and Mladen Ivanic, whereas his platform does not differ much from that of the Serb Democratic Party. On the other hand Plavsic has more liking for Kostunica that he has for her, while her Serb People's Alliance has good relations with the Democratic Christian Party of Serbia of Vladan Batic. Dodik, on his part, is on very good terms with the Social Democrats of Vuk Obradovic and Zarko Korac.

DEMOCRATS & PRAGMATISTS: Developments on the political scene in Republika Srpska will greatly depend on developments on the political scene in Serbia, especially when internal relations inside the DOS are concerned. In this, Milosevic will once more be indispensable. His decision to remain in Serbia could prove the cornerstone of differentiation within the DOS. Namely, the two most influential figures in the bloc are Vojislav Kostunica and Zoran Djindjic. The first is a slave to principles, a democrat and a moderate nationalist, a man respected by many but lacking friends among foreigners. What is most important, his strength lies in his being the most appealing person in the DOS, whom the group uses to present itself to the voters. Djindjic, on the other hand, is a man who believes that in cases where you do not have a majority, there is no reason for democracy either. He is the leader with the strongest infrastructure and most powerful organizational ability in the new Serbian government, is in favor of foreigners and is a skilled pragmatist. Speaking in terms of Republika Srpska, Djindjic is a kind of Dodik who has read Hegel. If the extradition of Milosevic to The Hague becomes a condition for a substantial foreign aid to Serbia and if Kostunica remains firm on this issue – and there is reason to believe that both of this will happen – the differences between him and Djindjic could become a demarcation line for voters in Serbia in the future, but for parties in Republika Srpska as well, whose political scene would closely follow the trends in Serbia.

Instead the earlier categories of “thieves” and “traitors,” that is, pro-Milosevic and anti-Milosevic groups, politicians in Republika Srpska will either side with Kostunica as a moderate nationalist, or Djindjic as a leader who believes that politics consists of a lot of economics, plus much more money and not a grain of ideology. In such a division, the Serb Democratic Party and the Socialists will side with Kostunica, and will have to adapt their rhetoric to the new circumstances. For them this will not be a major problem, but it will not prevent them from having nothing to do with Milosevic's Socialists. Not much far from there will be Ivanic, with much more maneuvering space and his ability to at least in his rhetoric unite democracy, national sensitivity and economics, and in doing so not appear a monster. The pragmatists in Belgrade will find themselves on the same side with Dodik and Plavsic, whose national-monarchist rhetoric was completely muffled after being dressed in Milorad Dodik's “social democratic” suit.

The RS political scene has already taken that direction. That is the truth, but in the Milosevic era any speech mentioning Serb national interests was considered illegitimate in advance. If Kostunica – a nationalist in the sense of having Serb interests at his heart, as Tony Blair has the interests of Britons or Al Gore those of Americans – succeeds in giving democratic legitimacy to such his concerns in the eyes of foreigners, the entire political scene in Republika Srpska will have the support of Belgrade. For that reason, if none other, it was worthwhile ousting Milosevic.

Zeljko Cvijanovic

(AIM)