Multi-Directional Political Differentiation

AIM Pristina, October 2, 2000

All political parties of Kosovo have been founded and operate within their national environments. Every observer can have at least two political impressions of such a situation. First, that a strong homogenisation of all national communities in Kosovo is in process. The second impression could suggest that in periods of pre-electoral activities, political parties only turn to members of their national communities. This is but a superficial observation of political and ethnic developments. In reality - curtains, fences and walls are not so strong. Nevertheless, such phenomena should be observed from different angles. In that way it would be possible to discover nuances and tectonic shocks which hinder the improvements, but also tendencies which stimulate, help and create circumstances for overcoming divisions and establishing integrations.

The distance between the Albanians and Serbs and their parties appears to be more pronounced than ever. This distance should be smaller between the Albanian and political parties of non-Serbian national communities, and somewhat more pronounced between the non-Albanian national communities and the Serbs. According to political assessments the distance between the Albanian and non-Serbian parties is much smaller than the one existing between the Albanian political blocs. The Albanian political blocs still cannot stand the sight of each other. On the other hand, in certain periods, the Moslem-Bosniac and Turkish parties, or more precisely some of them, have cooperated with either of the Albanian political blocs. An interesting aspect of the distancing between Kosovo national communities are differences and nuances in the stratification or even sharp political divisions.

From this point of view, it can be said in no uncertain terms that none of the political groups or parties are on mutually fraternal terms. In the entire spectrum of the Kosovo political relations and divisions, the only exception are the relations between Rugova's DSK and the Albanian Christian-Democratic Party of Kosovo. Perhaps it would be possible to find a similar example, but this one is most typical. The rivalry between "brothers" belonging to the same nation can be very pronounced, and even accompanied with grave accusations. It is assumed that there have been cases of armed showdowns between quarrelled Albanian blocs. Also well known are tendencies towards divisions of the Albanian bloc into revolutionary and democratic forces, into patriots and traitors.

Similar divisions and accusations have also been characteristic of the Serbian political bloc. However, there is an impression that such phenomena are mostly encouraged or accompanying the relations between the Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade. Occasionally, criticism, even very harsh words have been exchanged between Serb representatives from Gracanica and from Mitrovica. But, they did not include the division into patriots and traitors.

It is very interesting that few months ago suspicions and accusations of this kind have appeared between the Turkish National Party and the Turkish Democratic Union, including even verbal confrontations. This confrontation was mostly linked to their former relations with Belgrade regime and suspicions of a possible renewal of these relations if circumstances permitted.

Some time ago harsh controversies also appeared between parties and political groups which could be considered to belong to the Romany political corps, but without division into patriots or traitors. Although loyalty to Kosovo and its independence was mentioned, the impression was that political confrontations within this group were mostly motivated by rivalry and ambitions of securing "the priority place among national parties". As it is common knowledge, divisions as well as tendencies towards "national" differentiation of Romanies themselves, have occasionally developed within the Romany community in the South Balkans, mostly under the influence and political pressures of their stronger neighbours and states in which they live. As for Romanies, they speak about ethnic differences, while even international factors recognise internal differences in Kosovo. Thus, public in Kosovo now mentions Romanies - Askalies, Romanies - Egyptians, Serbian Romanies and just Romanies.

It is hard to say which are the first and which second, and what might "ethnic" differences between them be. It seems that the main criteria for making this kind of distinction are the extent to which they are close to the customs, language, religion of the majority people or the state. The question is how much can these criteria be applicable to such "ethnic" distinctions.

The Moslem-Bosniac-Gorani corps is also faced with a similar problem. The majority of this group keeps a clear distance with the Serbs and, at the same time, at least verbally, upholds the idea of independent Kosovo. After years of internal political squabbling, two fully independent parties have originated from the Party of Democratic Action, both of which claim to be the real Party of Democratic Action. Four political parties and groups from this corps will run in the coming local elections scheduled for October.

At first glance, it now seems that the stratification and intra-national political differences as well as those between national communities, are a matter of principle. But, that doesn't mean that there will be no nuances, as well as fundamental disagreements in the coming weeks and months. The problem of the integration of Serbs in Kosovo life and institutions might easily cause a dispute between Serbian groups in Gracanica and Mitrovica. The Albanian political parties might disagree regarding the definition of roads for the final regulation of their, as well as the status of Kosovo. Also, one of the two Turkish parties have been invoking the 1974 Constitution for months. It demands constitutional continuity with the intention of proclaiming the Turkish language third official language in Kosovo. It seems that the everyday political rhetoric has not yet defined the connection between that Constitution and the languages.

But, if such imprecision was intentional, insisting on this kind of continuity is indirectly linked with the problems of the status of Kosovo. Dilemmas and similar vagueness can easily come up regarding the activities of the Civil Initiative of Gora. Connections this Initiative might have with a number of Goranis who have been the right arm of the Belgrade regime years in all campaigns against the Albanians, have raised doubts.

The variety of potential candidates on the list for October communal elections and relations between numerous parties show that political and ethnic relations between national collectivities in Kosovo are nor just negative or positive. There are among them those who cooperated and co-existed before and have maintained such relations in an atmosphere of tolerance. However, there are some whose relations are deeply permeated by the lack of trust which makes even basic contacts between them impossible. That is why it can be generally said that relations between political groups and national communities in Kosovo are not so petrified as it may seem having in mind the contents which dominate the everyday political rhetoric and the Kosovo media.

AIM Pristina

Fehim REXHEPI