Defeat of Milosevic and Republika Srpska

Milosevic's beneficial departure would be the end of the need for the protagonists on the political scene in Republika Srpska to declare themselves in relation to the question whether they are in favour or against Slobodan Milosevic, which has regardless of the choice led it to the verge of self-destruction

AIM Banja Luka, September 28, 2000

Probably in the attempt to make almost three million of their voters sick of Vojislav Kostunica, on Tuesday Radio-Television Serbia informed them that, instead to congratulate him on the election results, the "puppet prime minister of RS", Milorad Dodik, bought the latest model of AUDI and sent it to Vojislav Kostunica to Belgrade as a gift. Poor propaganda usually relies on ignorance of facts: knowing Dodik, maybe he would have bought a new Audi, but for himself and sent Kostunica the old one. Knowing Kostunica, on the other hand, who thinks about Dodik the same as RTS, he would not have accepted even an aspirin from Laktasi, which one could not say for Milosevic, especially if the aspirin (or Audi for that matter) were wrapped up in about one hundred thousand ballots with his name circled on them.

SHOCK IN BELGRADE: The catch in this strange triangle of political likes and dislikes consists in the fact that on September 24 a strong shock happened in Serbia and, regardless of how it will end, that its effects will first be felt in RS. That is probably the reason why on the eve of Yugoslav elections political parties in RS restrained themselves from open cheering. With the exception of the Radicals of Nikola Poplasen who have already acquired the label of a fanatic religious sect because of their already proverbial abstention from voting, only those declared their likes and dislikes publicly who were forced to do it. For instance, Dodik who manifested his devotedness to anti-Milosevic international campaign in the Balkans by a literary essay ambitiously called "letter to Milosevic", in which he benevolently advised the president of FRY from the heights of Laktasi: "It is time for you to go, Slobodan".

Biljana Plavsic also happened to be there, who as the old Serb anti-communist illegal worker does not seem to have been informed that a single stubborn refusal of a hand-shake with Milosevic in Pale is not a sufficient political identity card any more, least of all a capital. Warning Milosevic not to steal votes in order to go into the second round of the elections "because he will not win even one tenth of the votes won so far", Plavsic used the opportunity to accuse Mirko Sarovic and her former protégé Jovan Mitrovic, and the Radicals, Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and Socialists that they were "promoters of Milosevic's policy" in RS. What was wrong with that, the Socialists wondered, and as the westernmost Milosevic's branch office, condemned Dodik's literary attempt. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, secretary general of the Socialists Milutin Pejic estimated the elections in FRY as fair and democratic and added that he knew that the Leftists would accept their results, but that he was not sure that, should it be defeated, the opposition would do it.

But there is something that puts on the same side both Dodik's composition and the I-was-the-first-to-hate-him guard of Biljana Plavsic, but also the suicidal loyalty of the Socialists. None of them showed that they knew exactly what happened (to them) last Sunday in FRY, nor that, regardless of the outcome, nothing will be the same in RS either.

IMPACT ON RS: If Milosevic puts down in blood the obvious election victory of Kostunica and Democratic Opposition of Serbia or tries to survive in power by delay and fraud until it falls into oblivion that elections in which he was beaten hands down have ever taken place in FRY, that blood and that fraud will strongly be felt in RS at least to the extent the blood shed in Serbia a year before was felt in April elections. Milosevic will for an indefinite time remain the central figure of the Balkan thriller and the main “bad guy” in comparison with whom Dodik might even resemble Willie Brandt, Plavsic De Gaulle, and Zivko Radisic Brezhnev's chamber-maid. This means that if Milosevic who lost the very last particle of legitimacy on Sunday remains in power despite everything, the political scene in RS will quickly develop as advocated by Plavsic and Dodik.

What does this mean? In November in B&H, this is a firm stand of foreigners, the first real postwar elections will be held. In other words, all previous elections were considered as lessons in democracy and healing war wounds and political follies, and only in these elections real authorities would be established for the period of four years. In such authorities the foreigners not only would not tolerate anybody who is even vaguely suspected of phoning Milosevic's Belgrade more than once a month, but the following would happen: between Serbia and the rest of the world such an iron curtain would be erected that all the previous sanctions would seem like child's play. Towards RS this curtain will be at least twice as high, and in November the voters will in fact choose between Dodik, Plavsic and Mladen Ivanic on condition that the latter promises that he would be good. In other words, as much as there will be of Milosevic in Serbia after Sunday elections, the less of him will be in Bosnia, regardless of the price. It is highly improbable that the foreigners will show any understanding for Radisic's leftist internationalism for the “brethren” across the Drina, for visits of Mirko Sarovic to the Patriarch, even for Ivanic's cautious assessment that the people in Serbia should elect their leadership without interference from abroad.

SPECIAL CONNECTIONS: If Milosevic remains, the foreigners will have to use their muscles in RS, if however the Balkan “bad guy” disappears, they will have to use their heads. It will become clear that behind the post-election statement of vice-president of Serb Democratic Party Dragan Cavic that results of the vote should be recognised “because they are an expression of the will of the people, and not anybody's wishes” or earlier Sarovic's praise of Kostunica, there is not too much love for Milosevic.

Does this mean that “new” SDS is cleansed of Milosevic's influence. Of course not. But it means that the stand of the new generation in this party is such that they would gladly throw Sloba down the drain but he would not let them be. One need not be too imaginative to conclude that such SDS is much closer to Kostunica than Dodik and Plavsic put together. One should not forget either that such Kostunica, if he does not decide to repeat Poplasen's steps towards the foreigners, would do more for the “human character” of SDS than their departure into the opposition, Dodik's blunders and Krajisnik's arrest put together. Probably in its further “humanisation” SDS will have to pass through another purgatory in which those who spent more time on Milosevic's divan will not fare well.

In case the regime in Belgrade changes, Ivanic will also sign with relief because the only thing that can dispel suspicion of foreigners why he does not pick on Milosevic is Milosevic's departure. However paradoxical it may sound, Milosevic's departure, more than for Dodik and Plavsic, will be beneficial for Radisic's believers and Poplasen's stubborn supporters. The mentality of the former shows that by voting for Milosevic they do not vote for the nationalistic concept of Greater Serbia, but for a leader from Belgrade, and whether his name is Tito, Milosevic or Kostunica, is less important. It is more important for Radisic to remain president as long as Kostunica is inaugurated in order to be seen under Kozara shaking his hand because people there already know that Zivko Radisic would never shake hands with a traitor. And finally, the Radicals can do nothing but wait to see whether Seselj will become a democrat, which he already manifested good will for when he refused to lend Milosevic some of his candidate's, Toma Nikolic's, votes and when he was the first to publish Kostunica's victory. The bad past is no problem for them and one can already imagine the Radicals, persuasive such as they are, explaining that by the border (of Greater Serbia) along the line Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica they in fact had in mind “special relations”.

Milosevic's beneficial departure would be the end of the need for the protagonists on the political scene in RS to declare themselves in relations to the question whether they are in favour or against Sloba, which has brought that scene, regardless of the choice, to the verge of self-destruction. Dodik would then be as much a democrat as he truly is, Sarovic would be as much a Serb as he truly is, and Ivanic would be one and the other as much as he can stand. With Milosevic's departure this political scene would pass through another purgatory and come to life; with his departure it would be reduced to something much worse than so far.

The problem is that among the Serbs the one who bets on the worst possibility is still believed to be the best political analyst.

Zeljko Cvijanovic

(AIM)