The Paradox of Seselj

Red-and-Black Coalition

Although their vital interest is to see Milosevic remain in power, the Radicals are also exceptionally keen on success of the opposition. By this they mean such a distribution of posts that the Socialists and the Leftists will not be able to form the federal government without them.

AIM Podgorica, September 15, 2000

(By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

The election campaign is drawing to its end – the Radicals of Vojislav Seselj would stop at nothing in order to achieve their goal. Deputy prime minister and presidential candidate of Serb Radical Party (SRS) Tomislav Nikolic declared that if he did not make it into the second round of the elections he would not call his voters to vote for Slobodan Milosevic; previously, together with his party colleague and minister of information in the government of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic he had submitted his resignation on the membership in the management board of Radio-Television Serbia (RTS); Seselj himself all of a sudden announced reconstruction of the Republican government with members of Serb Revival Movement (SPO) And otherwise, the Radicals' criticism of their coalition partners in both governments can be heard all over the place. Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Yugoslav Left (JUL), however, would not have been what they are if they had not given them tit for tat.

Is SRS putting up the act of being in the opposition again or is the love affair between the “Reds” and the “Blacks” finally over? All things considered – both seem to be the case. While participating in power with the Socialists and the Leftists, the Radicals have distinguished themselves with a series of extremely unpopular moves and lost their rigid nationalistic and populist image; for a large part of their voters they have become nothing but leaders who are concerned only with their own privileges. The additional complication is that the main “weapon” of the Radicals – verbal lynch of non-Serbs and opponents of the regime – is not efficient any more: ever since they have existed Serbia is but losing wars and becoming smaller, and the struggle against “the new world order” and “domestic NATO servants” has become the exclusive domain of the “Red” part of the coalition. Seselj and his supporters are trying to reclaim the old strongholds by very cheap demagogy and, with a little bit of luck, to take away a certain number of the votes from the opposition.

However, this is not an easy campaign for the Socialists either. Not only do they have to hand over to the Leftists about forty per cent of the places on the common list of candidates although they alone are organising and financing the campaign, but in public opinion polls – regardless of how false and who they were ordered by as they claim – their chances are quite poor. In other words, in the current situation, everyone is defending one's own interests, there is no giving way an inch to anyone, so this time Seselj must shift around for himself the best he can. This would not have been exceptionally painful in itself if in this “marriage of convenience” for majority of the Socialists SRS had not been just a “reserve” party and vice versa, so that they just take each other's votes. Therefore, there will be even more accusations and malice: the Radicals will try to win over the disappointed supporters of the “Reds”, the Socialists will exert all possible pressure to prevent that from happening and, on the contrary, to convince as many Seselj's Radicals as possible that this time it will not be very smart for them to circle candidates of SRS on the ballots.

Political points for the period after the elections are at stake. Unlike the Socialists and the Leftists for whom the elections on all levels are the question of to be or not to be, for the Radicals the only elections that really matter are the parliamentary ones: Nikolic is not even a theoretical threat to Milosevic, and the party itself has not even the minimum personnel potential that would be necessary for it to achieve any significant results in local elections. A disciplined voting machinery personified in deputies without whom the “Reds” cannot form a cabinet and on that basis bargaining for ministerial posts and membership in various management boards is the only thing Seselj is interested in.

Although one could rightfully claim that similar was the case in previous elections, the current ones threaten with a completely new post-election calculation. First, there are fifty deputies from Montenegro that Socialist People's Party (SNP) of the current federal prime minister Momir Bulatovic will automatically win thanks to the boycott of Montenegrin ruling coalition of that Republic's president Milo Djukanovic. Although Bulatovic's party comrades are completely loyal to Slobodan Milosevic, the fact that their seats will be decisive for parliamentary majority and establishment of the cabinet will inevitably result in their growing self-confidence and raising of their price: even if they cannot avoid being robbed of a number of posts by JUL, they need not agree to anything of the kind when the Radicals are concerned. The relations between the Socialists and the Leftists rely on the same principle: there is not as many posts as there are ambitions. In such circumstances, the space is narrowing down for the Radicals; although there is nothing personal in this fact, its pure business.

That is how Seselj and his SRS ended up in an extremely interesting position. Without the system established by Milosevic in the past ten years, neither they nor what they stand for would have been conceivable, so they are forced to be vitally interested in his survival. On the other hand, since the “Reds” have no votes to spare any more and since anyone appearing on the political scene is a dangerous rival for them, the Radicals are extremely interested in the success of the opposition, too, but to the extent which would mean that SPS and JUL will be unable to form the federal government without the Radicals. That would make Seselj feel at home. Since it is hardly possible that anybody from the opposition would ever enter a coalition with Milosevic, at a certain price (by no means too high) the Radicals would continue to rule in the spirit of “national unity” with the Socialists and the Leftists, and Serbia would continue to slide downhill. And that would be it. Next year, the same would be repeated in Republican elections. In other words, there would be new mutual accusations and gossiping, but without resignations from ministerial posts. A serious crisis of Milosevic would also affect Seselj – the two have passed such a political road that they nowadays are just different sides of the same coin.

Boycotted both by regime controlled media in order to prevent then from drawing away votes from those in power and by independent media due to Seselj's threats by liquidation of journalists, the Radicals use all possible means to attract attention. Like before, they use arrogance, insolence, cheap demagogy and provocation; like before, their supporters are undetectable by pre-election polls. It is evident that since the nationalistic balloon has gone flat and since the “Reds” have beaten them in verbal lynch of political opponents, Seselj is doing his best to attract attention of the citizens bewildered by the decade-long crisis and war and collect as many of their votes as possible. The only goal is that nothing changes in Serbia, that nothing improves.

Philip Schwarm

(AIM)