Pre-Election Serbia

Podgorica Jul 31, 2000

Taking over Belgrade

In contrast to Yugoslavia, which he has already adjusted to his needs by a bandit-like constitutional surprise attack, Milosevic is conquering its capital step by step, patiently, by its slow and systematic strangling.

AIM Podgorica, July 18, 2000

(From AIM Correspondent from Belgrade)

Faced with the loss of local elections in autumn 1996 - or better said, being forced by three-month civil protests in 1996/97 to acknowledge that defeat - Milosevic, allegedly, stated that Belgrade would be no problem. The opposition had no qualified pilot to fly that "jumbo jet" even if it were given to it in good repair. He hoped that in just a few months of running Belgrade, the opposition would show how incompetent it was and that the Belgraders would welcome the return of Socialists to power with ovations. Today, just before the new local elections, Milosevic is forced to drive out the Belgrade authorities with brute force after deploying the heaviest personnel artillery at presidential positions in municipal organisations.

The reason is not that Belgrade is functioning properly, nor that the municipal authorities have demonstrated special management capabilities, even in maintaining the basic functions of this two-million metropolis. Public transportation in Belgrade is non-functioning to bad, summer shortages of water - of rather "suspicious" quality - are chronic as are queues for medicines, milk, bread, oil, sugar and petrol, ruined city streets are buried under piles of garbage, jammed by booths and counters of street touts of various smuggled goods. Shop-windows packed with luxurious foreign goods, magnificent (empty) gas stations on the approaching roads to Belgrade or in the town itself, noticeable multitude of night clubs, restaurants and packed cafes, make this darkness - whether literal or metaphorical no matter - even thicker.

A THORN IN AUTHORITIES' FLESH: The key reason for the offensive of the Socialist-JUL-Radical coalition on the capital, which was launched this spring with full force, can be found in what used to be called "the Belgrade spirit" and - at least at this moment - its typical expression in a form which is sometimes visible as an ironic distance and sometimes as total indifference towards the authorities. It should, perhaps, be emphasised: Seselj's attacks on city officials, who have allegedly "destroyed" Belgrade, are ineffective, same as are the JUL-Socialist worried statements about the destiny of Belgraders exposed to sufferings because of the organisation of the "treasonous" and "mercenary" city authorities. The only thing certain, and confirmed many times in the past four years, is that the capital's inhabitants do not support Slobodan Milosevic and are therefore ready to shut their eyes (probably only temporarily) to the weakness of their local "power-holders".

In this case this relates to the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), which back in 1997 replaced the Mayor Zoran Djindjic in a kind of a coup, and brought to his place Vojislav Mihailovic, "General Draza's" grandson, who, with the support of former coalition partners from 1996 local elections, remained in power to this very day.

This support was extorted by the necessity of jointly opposing city Socialists, JUL's left and Seselj's Radicals who, in coalition, rule over Serbia and thereby dictate the conditions for Belgrade's survival. In the last three years, by means of various decrees the Republican Government decreased the budget of the city of Belgrade to less than one tenth of the amount former (Socialist) authorities had at their disposal, while the Republic "took over" the jurisdiction over the main sources of income - real estate transactions, management of construction grounds, proceeds from the renting of business space, etc. Even the Law on Housing Construction was changed overnight so that the officials in power could expand, adapt, build and change housing space on which either municipal or city authorities have no influence, and inspection services no authority. Roughly speaking, the Assembly of Belgrade has been reduced to running utility services and managing revenues from additional turnover tax of 3 percent which was charged only on the territory of Belgrade for the account of city budget.

THREE PERCENT MORE OR LESS: To make the irony even greater, the Socialist were the ones who, at the time of their rule, introduced the mentioned tax - known under the name "three percent tax" - being unable to manage the Belgrade "jumbo jet". Just before the 1996 elections, the coalition "Zajedno" (Together) promised to revoke this tax, if it won. And, indeed, after the elections the tax was not charged for a time, until the already meagre sources of city revenues totally dried out by numerous interventions of the regime. The new managers then realised that promises should not be made lightly and that three percent from someone else's pocket - even in an impoverished state such as Serbia - is much money. Early this year, after it first "shut down", i.e. took over, all other sources of Belgrade's financing, the Republican Government froze the account to which revenues from "three percent tax" were accruing.

The tactics of permanent "exposure of corruption" which the regime-controlled media have been applying against the Belgrade authorities from the very beginning, did not bring the expected results. Not because there is no corruption in the city services, but because of the absurd situation in which a regime, which is based on principles of family-client manufacturing, tries to seriously accuse someone of robbery, corruption and dishonesty. For years, the Belgraders, at least those who have kept their sense of humour, have made fun of the competition between the state Radio-Television Serbia and local "Draskovic's" Studio B in "exposing" (mis)deeds of the other side and praising their own achievements of all kinds.

RECONSTRUCTION, CONSTRUCTION AND DESTRUCTION: In all fairness, during last year's NATO bombing the Belgrade authorities behaved much more responsibly than the regime, with its "pumping of patriotism" and disregard of victims (except for propaganda purposes), JUL with its "defenders of bridges" who were active only before TV cameras and Radicals with their illiterate cries "We won't give Kosovo”. When even after a year, the state propaganda machinery failed to achieve the desired unity of the people and the regime, Milosevic turned to Belgrade. Perhaps as an additional factor for this decision to turn on the capital was "dissatisfaction with Belgrade" which was occasionally expressed in statements of opposition leaders which was, in their opinion, caused by insufficiently massive support of Belgraders for opposition activities.

Police repression, which until the end of last year, was mostly directed against students' movement "Otpor" (Resistance), was suddenly intensified this spring. Beating, bringing in and arresting spread from the streets into school yards and faculties. The proven way of hiring thugs in "plain clothes" in organising "spontaneous" actions of citizens was resorted to once again, and, in May, especially at the Faculties of Architecture, Philosophy, Law and Electrical Engineering. Professors who openly supported "Otpor" or did not publicly condemn it, were thrown out from faculties, some of them even by beatings. The undesirable persons were prohibited from entering faculty buildings even for commemoration service organised for a deceased colleague. When even this failed to produce the desired effect, in late May, Minister of Education ordered University rectors to conclude the school year within three days and "vacate the faculties".

Estimating well that the opponent should not have a moment to catch its breath, Milosevic at the same time intensified the pressure of the Belgrade media and public opinion. Under the infamous Law on Public information, the independent media were fined with over 30 million dinars (this June alone, almost 4 million). Belgrade was left without independent electronic media.

THROWING OUT AND JUMPING IN: As far as the public opinion is concerned, the Socialists' left and right arms: JUL and Radicals, have simultaneously started threatening it with the adoption of an anti-terrorist law which would - judging by the announcements of its most fervent advocates - prohibit loud, if not every thinking in Serbia. The opposition - which had just "united" - was knocked down. And while in mid-May the police beat up every passer-by in the streets of Belgrade and despite that the citizens kept protesting because of the seizure of Studio B, opposition leaders did nothing, said nothing, apart from occasional nonsensical statement, among which the one on the "disappointment" with the number of Belgrade protesters could have sounded - and sounded - offensive. After a week of beatings from one side and "big" words accompanied with endless meetings on the other, the protest ended by several hundreds of Belgraders spitting both authorities - the Belgrade "opposition" and the regime - all over.

The inability of city authorities (in this case this should read: the Serbian Renewal Movement), half-hearted and more than belated reaction to the regime's attack and "cutting off" of important municipal institutions and functions, made some analysts of local developments openly state their doubts that SPO was collaborating with the regime or, at least, in a tacit agreement in which both sides see and find some interest.

According to Gasa Knezevic, Executive Director of the Centre for the Promotion of Legal Studies, SPO was "suspiciously" behaving not only in the case of the seizure of Studio B, but also in the later "taking over" of the Municipal Public Transportation Enterprise. "I fear that there are those who have understood the opposition scene as a group of people doomed to be martyrs. However, (Draskovic's) greatest mistake was not that, but the fact that he "had his wires crossed" when he continued to wear the martyrs garb when he assumed power wanting to blend in his personality the unblendable - the power and martyrdom. One thing should not be forgotten here – when Belgrade is in question - he had minority power, supported by the SPS councilmen, and that "he that sups with the devil must have a long spoon".

And while the mentioned and similar events held the public attention, on the other side ground was being prepared for new regime's interventions. A the moment when Vuk Draskovic, Zoran Djindjic and Vojislav Kostunica were expecting to get Moscow's support for the "return" of Studio B, Belgrade private operators of public transportation finally went on the several times announced strike, demanding the increase of rates. A peculiar sense of humour ("Milosevic-like") could be observed in the fact that operators, whom the Belgrade authorities enabled to work - in an attempt to secure some kind of transportation - were the ones who were on strike.

The total collapse of the traffic, additionally and noisily debated by the state media, lasted several days - just enough for the Republican Government, naturally "in the interest of Belgraders" to "take over" the Belgrade Public Transportation Enterprise. Already the next day, private operators ended the strike and silently continued to transport citizens at old rates and the state media gloated over the final restoration of order - with the assistance of some fifty military and police buses. Everything ended up with the usual state of chaos and picture from the streets of Belgrade crowded with broken buses, like dinosaurs carcasses, which just that morning left the depot "roadworthy".

RECEIVERSHIP: It so turned out, at least for the time being, that expectations that the problem of Belgrade would be resolved by formal introduction of receivership, have not materialised. It seems that nothing can stop Milosevic's regime from doing that. Or just seems so.

Even the "shut down" Studio B - which is now yet another RTS channel – or "stifled" papers cannot annul what is, from the regime's point of view, Belgrade's main shortcoming - lack of any support for the Socialist-JUL-Radical coalition. Central Belgrade municipalities have been transferred to the opposition already at the time of the first multi-party elections. In two electoral cycles held till now, the rating of Socialists and their satellite parties did not improve, but just the opposite: the number of municipalities in which the Socialists do not have a single councilman is more likely to increase than decrease. In that respect Belgrade is growing more oppositional by the day - which doesn't mean that the popularity of opposition parties and, particularly of their leaders, is growing.

Milosevic's regime and its executives must be aware of that paradox, no matter how it may seem so just at first sight. It was therefore, no surprise that in the usual procedure, the Republican Government ended the blockade of city funds (accrued from the 3 percent tax) by a take-over. Because, as the explanation read, "the competent city authorities were inadequate in performing their job, both as regards the programme contents, as well as regards the entire procedure for its implementation". Behind the quoted master-piece lies the fact that some DM 60 million are in question, which will, from now on, be decided upon by the Republican Government - without unnecessary meddling of the Belgrade authorities or, God forbid, citizens. It seems that all moves made by the regime for seizing Belgrade can be interpreted best only in a broader context of the preparations for the long-lasting staying in power. Immobilised and, in that sense, half-dead Belgrade - on whose voters the regime cannot rely for support - serves as a warning to the Serbian province. Since the last year's NATO bombing, it has, in a way taken over the capital's role in resisting the regime.

From the regime's point of view, "liberation" of Nis, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Cacak, Kraljevo or any other opposition commune is less profitable than to financially strangle Belgrade. This is that singular case in which 3 percent amounts to more than 97 percent, and the "legal" stifling of the Belgrade papers actually represents further efficient destruction of the public opinion. And, finally when Belgrade "falls", the rest will be no problem.

Aleksandar Ciric

(AIM)