Army of Yugoslavia and Montenegro

Podgorica Jul 19, 2000

Military Units on the Alert

Does the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) have an elaborated plan for federal elections that the official Podgorica intends to boycott

AIM Podgorica, July 15, 2000

The amendments of the federal Constitution arranged by Belgrade regime, as well as declaration of Montenegrin parliament about them adopted at the session on July 7 and 8, led into temptation not just the Montenegrin ruling coalition, but also the command of the Second Army in Montenegro, more precisely: its readiness to act in support to Slobodan Milosevic's ambitions regardless of the price.

Unlike Montenegrin politicians, the Army does not seem to have had any doubts. On Wednesday, July 5, commanders of VJ had already started preparations. General Milorad Obradovic, commander of the Second Army stationed in Montenegro, visited units of Uzice Corps in order to get an insight into the level of their preparedness for combat. Almost simultaneously, the General Staff issued a statement in which Montenegrin president was accused of “destroying the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. And the next day, together with admiral Milan Zec, commander of the Navy, Obradovic paid a visit to general Nebojsa Pavkovic, head of the General Staff. From Pavkovic, according to our source from the command of the Second Army, Obradovic “received specific orders in connection with the actions of parts of the Army of Yugoslavia in Montenegro”.

Two days later, while in the early morning the debate in Montenegrin parliament was drawing to its end, all the commanders of the Second Army and Navy received orders to be prepared to put the units on full alert and prepare for action.

“The plan of the use of the army that night included taking tanks out into the streets of Podgorica and blocking with armoured combat vehicles the buildings of Montenegrin assembly, government of Montenegro and certain other facilities of vital importance. And the Navy and military police would act as they already do, but strictly by the book”, says a high officer of the Second Army.

In his interview for Monitor weekly, he estimated that this plan would have been carried out had the Assembly tried to pass a more radical measure than the one it did; something like independence of Montenegro, for instance. “It was also planned that units of Uzice corps be reinforced by two special units of the First and the Third Army. It was planned that considerable infantry forces which were recently moved from the territory of Montenegro to Serbia, with somewhat different equipment and composed differently, would at the right moment dash back to Montenegro”, claims this officer.

But Montenegro did not “react nervously and rashly and fall into the trap of a war scenario”, as president Djukanovic declared later. Numerous political and military analysts seem to agree with this assessment. Almost immediately, voices of support and understanding for the decision of Montenegrin Assembly were heard from the world, along with statements that Milosevic was playing with fire. And then temperature dropped by several degrees.

The problem, however, lies in the fact that Belgrade needs federal elections badly. And leaders of Montenegrin coalition in power have firmly promised that there would be no elections in Montenegro. That is why one can say that army preparations have not been made in vain and thoughtlessly. Because in the Army of Yugoslavia, like in Belgrade, they know very well that, pursuant the Constitution of Montenegro, the Assembly cannot decide on political independence of Montenegro, as well as that this privilege belongs to the citizens of Montenegro who can decide about its further political destiny only by referendum.

Judging by that, the order to the commanders of the units of the Second Army to be prepared for putting the units on the alert is more an expression of the disposition in the ranks of VJ to what is happening in Montenegrin policy than a prepared answer to a theoretically possible sudden denouement. This was in fact a clear signal that no independent decision of Montenegro on its own political destiny fits into military plans, neither the one reached by the assembly nor by the people in a referendum. And the latter is the straw the ruling coalition in Montenegro is relying on.

Therefore it seems that the political conflict between Podgorica and Belgrade which has lasted for years is drawing to a logical end. Although forecasts about what lies ahead in the next two or three months differ, almost everybody agrees that it will be comparatively peaceful in Montenegro until federal elections are scheduled. And then, as our interlocutor says, “relations between Belgrade and Podgorica will escalate and, most probably, a war conflict will break out”.

After last week's amendments of the Constitution of FRY, Montenegro almost certainly will not participate in federal elections. This is also confirmed by the recent meeting of representatives of Serbian opposition parties from Serbia and Montenegrin authorities in Sveti Stefan. Leaders of opposition parties from Serbia accepted the political platform on redefining relations in the federation which was the condition set more than a year ago by president of Djukanovic and Montenegrin ruling coalition for operation of the federal state. And if Montenegro decided to accept participation in federal elections, it is assumed that not only its agencies would collapse, but it would also lose every political influence in the federal state.

The danger that Milosevic will try to resolve his controversy with Podgorica by a coup in Montenegro still exists. It appears as if the plot has been written a long time ago. It is logical, it is assessed in Montenegrin police, to expect that Momir Bulatovic's Socialist People's Party (SNP) and the pro-Serbian block of parties, without approval of Montenegrin authorities, will organise and carry out federal elections in Montenegro. And federal institutions will proclaim that the seventh Battalion and the already formed similar forces on the territory of Serbia are units of federal police which will then try to take over jurisdiction over the vital activities of Montenegrin state, it is claimed by men from the top of Montenegrin Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Should this happen, a conflict between Montenegrin police and the part of the Army of Yugoslavia inclined towards Milosevic is inevitable. This sounds frightening, but it is realistic.

Goran VUJOVIC

(AIM)