Papandreou's New (Nationalist?) Greek Foreign Policy Doctrine

AIM Athens, July 8, 2000

"Papandreou's doctrine in foreign policy" was one headline ("Exousia" 1 July) summarizing the previous day's foreign policy debate in the Greek cabinet. "Don't take us for granted. The old motto 'we have no claims we make no concessions' is over" added another ("Ependytis" 1 July). "Our claims from Ankara: the top-secret report" was a third newspaper's exclusivity a couple of days later ("Imerisia" 3 July). Interestingly enough, these newspapers that published large sections of the debate and related reports are all financial dailies or weeklies.

"Suddenly, the salience of foreign policy issues rose dramatically and leading government members gave the impression of competing amongst themselves as to who will appear to be the toughest towards Albania and Turkey and the most exigent towards FYROM with respect to the agreement on the issue of the country's name" commented a few days later Sotiris Sideris in "Exousia" (7 July).

Indeed former Albanian President Sali Berisha, who campaigns with Hellenophobic slogans ahead of next fall's local elections, will probably be very happy with the just published priorities of Greek foreign policy in Albania that can only add fuel to his arguments. Their emphasis lays, in that order, on the Greek minority, the other Orthodox Christian population, the South and the Greek firms in that country, with two more private Greek schools to be opened there. How can Greece avoid once again the charge of "Hellenization" of the South with such officially stated priorities? How can a discriminatory preference for helping, besides the Greek minority, just the Orthodox rather than all the population of Albania is not going to embarrass the Greek Orthodox Archbishop Yannoulatos, often attacked by Albanian nationalists as a torch-bearer of Greek nationalism in Albania?

During the foreign policy debate in the Greek cabinet, Deputy Foreign Minister Elizabeth Papazoi introduced the requirement for a minority policy for Greece. Her argument, though, was not proactive, that is a result of the country's commitment to human rights and respect of the multicultural character of Greek society. It was rather reactive: such policy was a mere need to respond to the publication of various international reports, damaging for Greece. According to her, Greece should deal with such concerns (only) because they will be soon debated everywhere in Europe. Coincidentally, the most recent, and most crucial, report was that of the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), released a couple of days before the cabinet debate. In it, Greece was asked inter alia to "raise the awareness among the general public of the multicultural reality of Greek society (ECRI "Second Report on Greece," 27 June 2000, p. 4). In its appended answer, Greece rejected that recommendation. It argued that the ECRI report "seemed to ignore [Greek] reality" while "the Greek Government and the Greek society are well aware of the reality prevailing in the country ... [but there is no] adherence by the Greek Government to the notion of a multicultural character of the Greek society" (p. 25). In a public debate (29 June) Ms. Papazoi had criticized the ECRI report and especially its emphasis on the multicultural character of Greek society, as she, like so many Greeks, believes that Greek society is homogeneous and resists successfully "international assimilatory pressures."

Moreover, in that cabinet meeting, Foreign Minister George Papandreou was surprisingly subscribing to the old nationalist approach to the minorities of the Treaty of Lausanne: Greece's Muslims are not Turkey's concern but Greece should defend the rights of Greeks in Turkey... He said: "On the issues related to the Muslim minority, Turkey cannot have any role or say. They are internal matters of our country ... Certainly, we, in turn, have raised several issues towards Turkey, in the framework of our relations, be it the issue of [the Theological Seminary in] Halki, or that of the properties of the Greeks who live there, or that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. There are many concerns from our side [towards Turkey] on the negotiating table that await satisfactory answers from the other side."

The above references to the Papazoi and the Papandreou arguments during the cabinet meeting were made in the same-day briefing by the government spokesman, Minister of the Press and Mass Media Dimitris Reppas. The latter, in answering questions on the "Slavomacedonians", stated that Greece recognizes no other minority than the one mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne. While he stressed that there is no issue of dealing with the problems of the Slavomacedonians that had lost their citizenship during and immediately after the Greek civil war, some fifty years ago.

The document on the new doctrine presented to the cabinet was presumably confidential but was conveniently leaked to many newspapers. Then, one of its reportedly top-secret appendices not presented even in the cabinet meeting, was leaked to "Imerisia" (3 July). Greece's claims on Turkey, according to it, related not only to the Greek but even to the Arab Orthodox Christian minorities in Turkey. They included reforms of the election of the Patriarch and his Holy Synod; concerns over the legal personality of the Patriarchate and the property of Greeks in Turkey; the status of autonomy for the islands of Imvros and Tenedos; and even the official recognition as a minority of the Orthodox Christian Arabs ("Antiocheians") in the Turkish-Syrian border. Most of these claims are, at least formally, legitimate.

However, when George Papandreou insists that Turkey has no right to defend the rights of the Turkish minority in Thrace, it is difficult for the Greek government to argue that it has the right to raise such claims towards Turkey. Not to mention that, should this happen, Turkey will probably reciprocate with an equally exhaustive list of claims for the minority in Thrace. Plus, Turkey will have an advantage: to substantiate such concerns, it could easily simply quote a multitude of international non-governmental and inter-governmental reports that have reliably ascertained human rights violations in Greece. While the problems of the Greek minority in Turkey have remained largely obscure for the international community as for decades the Greek foreign ministry has discouraged the Greek community in Turkey to turn to non-Greek-state institutions for the presentation of its valid claims.

One may therefore wonder why George Papandreou opted to compile and let be leaked such an aggressive, practically nationalistic, list of priorities towards Turkey and Albania, while he allowed the government spokesman to categorically reject the legitimate demands of the Macedonians. Was not he who, a year ago, was heralded for his effort to help Greeks understand that they have to come to terms with the presence of Turks and Macedonians in their country? The answer lays perhaps to his reaction soon after these statements were made last year: the widespread backlash against him made him "forget" these positions, avoid meeting with genuine minority and non-governmental representatives, and postpone indefinitely Greece's ratification of the Framework Convention on National Minorities. With obvious leadership ambitions within PASOK, that are fueled by a very high popularity, he cannot be seen to provoke a public opinion that, as the recent events around the mention of religion on identity cards have shown, remains traditional and nationalist.

Panayote Dimitras