Bargaining in Ruling Coalition

Price of Radicals' Support

AIM Podgorica, July 4, 2000

(By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

Thanks to the Radicals of Vojislav Seselj, the law on struggle against terrorism which should have been passed in the assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the last day of June, was sent back for further elaboration and “additional bringing into line” with other regulations, which has quite seriously and unexpectedly disturbed the usual summer lethargy in political life of Serbia. Just a day before this long announced law evidently intended for the struggle against opponents and conceived in laboratories of Yugoslav United Left (JUL) arrived in federal parliament nothing indicated that the Radicals would challenge this ambitious project of their coalition partners. In fact, that very morning federal minister of justice Petar Jojic (who is a member of the Serb Radical Party-SRS) heartily defended the draft of this law obviously uninformed that just a couple of hours later his party boss Vojislav Seselj would declare that full political agreement was not reached, that is, that the drafted law had to be further elaborated. All this leads to the conclusion that Seselj himself seems to have decided in the last minute to get involved in this political manoeuvre with his coalition partners and that he did not have the time to inform even his minister about what would happen.

About the reasons that made Vojislav Seselj “fail” the Socialists (SPS) and the Leftists in the minute to twelve, one could hear various theories in the past couple of days. The least serious is certainly the one which refers to “squeamishness” of the Radicals because of such a rigid law. Allegedly not even they liked some of the provisions of the law which enables the power wielders to keep the country in a sort of a permanent state of emergency without any need to even publicly proclaim it. In all the former public appearances the Radicals have never shown that they were bothered by the attempts of the regime to get rid of its opponents and reduce political life in Serbia down to a two-party system – the two parties of the Left and the Radicals. And that is exactly what might come out of the law officially intended to fight terrorism and terrorists, which actually do not exist in Serbia. Organised crime, frequent murders and liquidations with traces of fishy money and politics (and there is plenty of those in Serbia), are of course something completely different because of which there was no need to draft a special law.

In numerous analyses of Seselj's refusal to, at least for the time being, support this project of his coalition partners, the so-called “boomerang effect” of the drafted law was often mentioned, as well as the alleged awareness of the Radicals that some day Milosevic might let them go down the drain, look for a new coalition partner and use the anti-terrorist law for a crackdown with the Radicals. Should the Radicals, after certain amendments of the drafted provisions, soon change their minds and vote in favour of this law (leaders of JUL claim that this is exactly what will happen in a few days), the story about fear of “boomerang effect” and two ends to a stick would prove to be completely absurd. In Seselj's refusal to vote at once in favour of this law a part of Serbian opposition also recognised what suited them the most – a serious crack in the ruling coalition and the beginning of the end of the idyll between the Radicals on the one hand and SPS and JUL on the other. It seems however, that even those who publicly stated such assumptions do not actually believe the theory on a quick end of the “love affair” between the Radicals and the two leftist parties. It is more probable that in this love triangle (SPS-JUL-SRS) Seselj does not wish to be neglected for a minute and he is starting to make it quite clear that this summer, before the forthcoming elections (that will most probably take place in October), his price will go up, especially because both he and the other parties in the coalition, know very well that Milosevic can neither preserve nor win power again without the Radicals.

The fact that Seselj has started (and knows how) to bargain was claimed even by some Socialists during the break of last week's assembly session when the drafted law was withdrawn from the procedure. A definite plan for running in the forthcoming elections has not been made by the ruling coalition which is waiting to see whether Vuk Draskovic and his Serb Revival Movement (SPO) will remain true to their word and boycott the elections. Even in that case, the possible united appearance of the rest of the opposition, but also the logic of the election system, would not permit the Leftists and the Radicals to experiment much in local elections. That is why it is highly probable that they will have to appear with a single list of candidates and negotiations on that still lie ahead. The opposition negotiations on this topic show how complex and unpleasant business is when everyone demands just a little less than hundred per cent for oneself. The election law permits the Radicals to run in the elections on their own, but an agreement and final decision of the coalition partners still have to take place.

Having in mind what still lies ahead, Vojislav Seselj, who has many times before manifested how pragmatic he is, estimated most probably that this is the right moment to show SPS and JUL that he does not agree to play a subordinate role in the ruling coalition. And that his remaining in power in the future implies most probably a much bigger share of power. In the federal and the Republican government the Radicals for a long time have a considerable number of ministerial posts, but they certainly are not satisfied with the “quality” of power they hold. During all this time Seselj has never managed to get closer to certain government departments the two parties of the Left are still keeping solely to themselves. There is no Seselj and his followers in the affairs concerning the army and the police, they do not interfere with nor ask too many questions about foreign policy either. With the exception of a few “sympathizers” of this party, there are no Radicals in the National Bank of Yugoslavia, there are just a few in state prosecutor's office, there is not too many of them even where they officially hold ministerial posts, their draft regulations in the assembly of Serbia wait for a long time to enter the procedure. For example, despite the fact that Aleksandar Vucic is the minister of information in the government of Serbia, in majority of regime controlled media Vojislav Seselj still does not enjoy the status of a first-rate state official – all information about him as the deputy prime minister are “filtered” while he fares better as a party leader. Among average readers this makes the impression that the Radicals are not exactly in power as much as their coalition partners of the Left, that they are much less visible in regime media than others in power.

In all the spheres, therefore, there could be something to gain – from the National Bank to certain other fields and institutions which the Radicals could not get in. On the day when the anti-terrorist law was withdrawn from procedure, certain deputies from the ranks of the Socialists were discussing in low tones how much the support of the Radicals would have to be paid. There were also those who feared a little that SRS might appear in departments in which it was not present so far. If it is true that passing of this law would among other lead to reconstruction of some kind of federal police or special federal units, Seselj certainly would not be ready to support such a project if the Radicals would not be able to participate.

Those well informed claim that inside the ruling coalition there are incessant minor or major conflicts mostly because of interests. Seselj is annoyed (he himself made it clear in public recently) because JUL is persistently favouring another radical party of the left “Nikola Pasic” and ensures that their statements for the public regularly get significant attention in state media. It is a party of almost no real influence, but in the elections as a rule it takes away at least ten odd thousand votes from real Radicals because politically insufficiently informed voters circle the first Radicals they come across on ballots. At the same time the Socialists are annoyed because Vojislav Seselj uses every opportunity to call on the federal government to break off diplomatic and all other relations with Croatia and constantly re-opens the question of the long gone Republic of Serb Krajina. The fact that ministers from the ranks of SRS are members of the federal government is often quite unpleasant for those who are creating foreign policy of the country and who are forced to explain that something is not the stand of the whole government. The pragmatic leader of the Radicals is also aware that nothing will come out of the story about RSK, but he relies on the fact that a certain number of refugees have received Yugoslav citizenship and that they have the right to vote on the forthcoming elections. The Socialists are also annoyed that in Zemun where they hold the local power the Radicals have already changed the electoral districts in the manner which practically guarantees their victory in new elections. The Radicals were extremely annoyed when the Socialists prevented them to do the same at a recent session of New Belgrade municipal assembly, and left the session in protest and their coalition partners without quorum. They are even more annoyed that a few of their draft legal regulations, primarily in the sphere of economy, are waiting to catch attention in the assembly of Serbia.

All that, however, does not mean the beginning of the end of the idyll which has prevailed in the ruling coalition until now. Indeed, there has never been a true idyll, but just pragmatic book-keeping of mutual giving and taking. A little over a year ago, just before signing of the so-called Kumanovo agreement, the Radicals claimed that they were definitely walking out of the government because they could not go back on their principles and approve of the presence of foreign soldiers in Kosovo. Then they thought a little and concluded that in a delicate moment for the nation and the state they could not allow “non-patriotic forces to take over significant levers of power. The coalition which has survived the “Kumanovo Peace” will survive one anti-terrorist law. But it will have to be paid for.

Nenad. Lj. Stefanovic

(AIM)