Berisha Forbidden to Enter Kosovo

AIM Tirana, 15 June, 2000 Former president of Albania Sali Berisha was forbidden to enter Kosovo after the decision of UN civil administrator Bernard Kouchner. Berisha sharply reacted against this decision, while on the other side, people who had come out to greet him protested in a few towns in Kosovo.

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Six vehicles escorting former president had just approached Kukes on the border with Kosovo when a problematic peace of news arrived from the headquarters of their party in Tirana. One of TV stations in the capital, TV Klan, informed that Berisha would not be permitted to enter Kosovo on the ground of the decision of administrator Kouchner.

It is not known how seriously former president took this, but it was already late when a postman from Kukes knocked at the door of the hotel to hand the letter from Kouchner to the president of the opposition party.

In fact, that whole day, diplomatic and official channels worked intensively. In UN administration in Pristina hardly anybody thought that Berisha would not be able to interpret the signals he had received and that he would actually set out on the announced journey.

However, when about 12 o'clock news arrived in Pristina that Berisha's convoy of cars had started towards Kukes and that his men had already settled in Prizren and were preparing a welcome for him, things started to move in UNMIK. The administrative council met immediately and the only item on the agenda was a debate about Berisha's visit to Kosovo. This probably was not a pleasant debate and it lasted several hours. At least until 17.45 h when Kouchner finally wrote the official letter and when general Ortuno was given orders to prevent entrance of Mr. Berisha to Kosovo pursuant Item 2 of UNMIK rules of procedure. At 18.00 h the news was already prepared and the correspondents in Pristina, including the correspondent of TV Klan were officially informed. To expressed concern of one of them that Berisha might enter Kosovo by force, an officer answered ironically: "If he enters on foot over Pastrik where KLA used to enter, it might happen. But not in Morina". At the same time four armoured vehicles of German forces in Prizren set out towards Morina. Other forces were put on the alert in Prizren and Pristina. At 20.00 h, the news was put on the air.

As customary in such cases, persons accompanying Berisha still knew nothing. The newspaper of the Democratic Party published on its front page in bold letters "Berisha in Pristina Today". However, Berisha did not head towards the border. After the press conference in which he angrily reacted to Kouchner's decision, he started on his way back to Tirana.

How Was Berisha Warned?

When in mid May, the Democratic Party announced the forthcoming visit of Mr. Berisha to Pristina, this caused quite a lot of uneasiness in UNMIK. The data it collects recorded an increase of the political influence of Tirana on the policy in Pristina and that unfortunately this influence was exerted in the worst possible way. This was not an institutional influence, but the influence of individual parties and personages on certain parties and personages in Pristina. The game that had started at the moment when international attention had focused on Kosovo which without doubt was aimed at personal promotion of the politicians in Tirana by using their influence on politics in Kosovo.

It seems that this was the logic according to which Nano was not officially invited to participate at the convention of the Party for Democratic progress of Kosovo (now the Democratic Party of Kosovo), as Nano himself declared. Thaci's decision seemed to have been influenced not by the situation in Pristina as much by the pressure exerted by international community that the leaders of Albanian political parties be held as far from Kosovo as possible.

However, president Meidani visited Kosovo and Kouchner himself welcomed him at the airport, using the book fair as a pretext. Meidani's vocabulary was very cautious, and noisy rallies were avoided. Meidani met with the whole spectre of political parties in Kosovo, except with representatives of Rugova's party, who had preferred to go to Rome instead.

Soon after Meidani's visit, Berisha announced that he would go to Kosovo. The first thing that sprang to the minds of the diplomats in Pristina when they heard this was the connection between Berisha and Rugova and that an official invitation of the latter would follow. It is known that considerable pressure was exerted on Rugova not to send the leader of the Democratic Party an official invitation. It is also known that Rugova and Berisha were in contact by phone, but that this contact has not changed Rugova's decision. However, Berisha has modified his decisions considerably. He postponed his visit scheduled for 12 June, which coincided with the anniversary of entrance of NATO troops in Pristina, to take place on June 15 instead. He declared that during his visit he would meet parties of all orientations, including Thaci's. He declared that he would not organise a single rally, and that he would come to convey a message on tolerance.

But, nothing changed in the decision of UNMIK and therefrom of Rugova. Some time later, at dinner given on the occasion of Solana's visit to Pristina, Solana looked sharply at Rugova when they were speaking about Berisha's visit to Pristina. Solana did not hesitate to ask in hostile tone: "Who is inviting him to come here?" Nobody knows whether Berisha had been informed about the resolute tone of this dialogue, but it is known that he has not received an official invitation from Rugova. It is hard to believe that a politician of Berisha's experience has disregarded such a clear sign about his visit. But if Berisha did not hesitate to clarify at a press conference that he would visit Pristina on June 15, Macedonian government made it clear to UNMIK that it would not look with benevolence upon Berisha's visit to the territory controlled by it, from the point of view of not an exactly good situation in Bitolj and Tetovo.

In order to be absolutely clear about its intentions, UNMIK unofficially declared in the press of Kosovo that Berisha was not welcome in Kosovo. A day later after the news had been published, they specified that the visit could be just a private one and that Berisha had no right to organise either rallies or official meetings with political parties in Kosovo. It is hardly possible to be more precise about things.

It seems that Bukoshi's presence and the belief that he wished to reappear on the political scene of Kosovo and profiteer from Berisha's visit has also played quite a big influence on the decision of UNMIK. Especially because information from Prizren spoke about preparations to welcome Berisha with large gatherings and plenty of noise. Finally, when news arrived from Tirana that a caravan of president of the Democratic Party had started from Tirana, Kouchner decided to convene a session of the administrative council.

Why Berisha Was Not Allowed to Go to Kosovo

Of all the statements made in the past week, one thing is certain: Berisha has been prevented from coming for safety reasons, but it was just one of the causes. This was clear on June 14, when having forgotten about her statement of the day before, spokeswoman of UNMIK, Susan Manuel, declared: "The situation in Kosovo is strained and Berisha's visit might cause even greater tensions".

But then, why was the leader of Democratic Party prevented from visiting Kosovo when many other Albanian politicians had visited Kosovo before him, starting from president Meidani, former prime minister Majko and foreign minister Milo? On the basis of statements, comments, public appearances, a clear idea about it may be created. There had been more than one reason that forced UNMIK to reach such an unpopular decision, which, it should be said, was not opposed by any of ethnic Albanian politicians present in the administrative council. The first and most superficial reason was linked to public gatherings and the threat they are in Kosovo. And Berisha practically cannot do without rallies and public performances. However, if the problem of rallies and crowds was just one of the elements but not the decisive one, another analysis affected the decision of UNMIK. The idea that Albanian politics can transfer its conflicts to Kosovo and the fact that Albanian politicians will try to reinforce their positions in the country by using their contacts in Pristina were decisive. Foreign diplomats over there are convinced that Albanian policy has preferential treatment in Kosovo. Berisha himself proved this a year ago when at the height of NATO bombing and while Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was the public ally of the West, he did not shrink from strongly attacking Thaci and his units. Commentaries of the Democratic Party and its press were not read with pleasure in the USA, not even counting Berisha's statement against signing of the agreement in Rambouillet which he corrected a day after.

The idea that Berisha could come to Kosovo in order to offer public support to Rugova, just as Nano could do for Thaci, forced the international administrator to be cautious when this visit was concerned. They have always been careful not to allow the different parties in Albania to be reflected in Kosovo. The fear that extreme polarisation of Albanian politics might be exported to the politically fragile Kosovo has played its role. Despite public misunderstandings, Thaci, Hajradinaj and Rugova have comparatively normal mutual contacts which might be undermined due to the influence of Tirana.

And finally, both UNMIK and more broadly international representatives have always preferred institutional contacts assuming that communication with them is always easier and more normal, as the quiet visit of Meidani proved.

Return

Berisha arrived in Tirana in the afternoon on June 14. Without the noise which had accompanied the set out, without the characteristic enthusiasm, while a hall crowded with journalists awaited statements. He reproached the decision of Kouchner and read the text of his unsent message addressed to the Kosovars which, to be truthful, was written in very careful and moderate terms. At the same time media carried an unexpected commentary of Rugova according to which Kouchner's decision was a reasonable decision. This put the former president in a specially delicate position.

But regardless of pretexts, the denied right and everything else, one thing cannot be concealed. Berisha was given more than one signal, but he has never interpreted that code. Surrounded by euphoria, by people who are incapable of deep analysis, Berisha had set out towards what might have been his triumph, but returned defeated which might cost him a lot.

Blendi FEVZIU (AIM)