Second Attempt on the Life of President of Serb Revival Movement

Vuk (Wolf) Hunt

AIM Podgorica, 19 June, 2000

(By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

“At the moment of the shooting, I swiftly threw myself down and the bullets passed over me while I was rolling over on the floor searching cover behind the pillar”, explained to journalists president of the Serb Revival Movement (SPO) Vuk Draskovic, how he had survived the attempt on his life. This was happening on 15 June, around 23.45 in Draskovic's house in Budva. He was alone and, as it is stated, as soon as he entered the dining room, a volley was shot at him. One bullet scratched the leader of SPO on the temple and another shot him through his left ear.

In the first statement of the ministry of internal affairs (MUP) of Montenegro the following is said: “unknown perpetrator or more of them approached the building from the yard and through an open window shot seven bullets from a 7.65 mm calibre gun of for the time being unknown type and number, in the direction of Draskovic". Statements similar to this one are often issued by MUP of Serbia – whenever a minister, a high official of “left” parties in power, a businessman, a paramilitary commander is shot, and nothing to say about prominent figures from the underground – and as a rule, that is the end of it. However, the statement of assistant minister of internal affairs of Montenegro, Vuk Boskovic, not only makes a significant difference between the counterparts from the two republics, but also threatens with unforeseeable political consequences.

“MUP has in its possession the weapon which the act has been committed with, persons who have committed the act, those who have assisted them and we know who had ordered the act”, said Boskovic for daily news show of TV Montenegro, but that for the time being – “for understandable reasons” – the names and other details cannot be made public. He also declared that the assassins, immediately after Draskovic's arrival, came to Montenegro from Serbia with the plan to liquidate him. Boskovic has, therefore, indirectly pointed his finger at certain official instances in Belgrade. Draskovic himself was much more specific.

“It is perfectly clear that Serbia is a terrorist state controlled by bandits”, he said and accused state security service for the assassination, that is, that the order that he be killed could have been given only by those who head the state – “and they are Slobodan Milosevic and his wife”.

President of SPO also declared that a few days ago he had received information that his murder had been ordered and stressed that the arrest of his four bodyguards two weeks ago had paved the road to the attack in Budva.

In the past eight months, this is the second attempt on the life of Vuk Draskovic. In a staged traffic accident of the Ibar main road on 3 October, 1999, three members of his security staff and Veselin Boskovic, director of the commission for city construction land and brother of Draskovic's wife Danica, were killed. By some miracle the leader of SPO was then just light injured at the time, and MUP of Serbia – extremely conspicuously – failed not only to determine the identity of the truck driver who caused the accident and its owner, but even the licence plate number.

Who and why is bothered by Draskovic so much that an attempt was made on his life twice already?

There are several dimensions in the answer to this question. Serb Revival Movement is not only the biggest opposition party with the best developed political infrastructure; it is also the richest. Having control of local authorities in Belgrade and in a considerable number of other cities in Serbia, such as Novi Sad, Kragujevac, etc., party officials have procured for themselves a large number of profitable sinecures. Activities and various moves of SPO are still experienced by many as the main obstacle to united action of the opposition and in this context it is often possible to hear more or less open accusations that Draskovic is flirting with the regime, that he is hoping for some kind of a deal, and it is emphasized that he had become a federal deputy prime minister just before NATO intervention. Such a calculation, therefore, eliminates every motive of the regime, or allows it but under condition that there is a faction within it which wishes to prevent any change of the political status quo.

However,there is another calculation. Without Draskovic – who still has charisma among his supporters – and the infrastructure of SPO, the rest of Serbian opposition can hardly achieve any results; sinacures from local administration is one of the foundations for maintenance of the mentioned party logistics. The passivity when the government of Serbia seized RTV Studio B which was fully controlled by SPO through the Belgrade city assembly, can perhaps be explained by corruption in the ranks of this party, but also by political strategy to become the only relevant factor in the opposition and, finally – as the assassination in Budva shows – as the result of the fact that Draskovic was threatened. Despite its aggressiveness, the regime is in a deep crisis, developments in the country are quite unpredictable, and in such a situation SPO and its leaders can be the main creators of changes. The main thing is partly in the fact that the decisions of the party leadership can comparatively efficiently be implemented and that there are means for that, and partly that the policy of SPO or a considerable part of the establishment can be a way out of the situation in which it is impossible to preserve but nor to surrender power. Liquidation of Draskovic, due to his expressed leadership in the party, reduces the possibility of anything of the kind practically to zero.

“I think that this is not the right time to speak about a definite strategy, but I can say that there are no conditions for free life in Serbia”, Draskovic answered to the journalists to the question about his political plans. He also said that it was “necessary to proclaim a moratorium on the activities of political parties, to completely unmask the dictatorship”. These statements, like hardly anything else, reflect the vacuum in which Serbian opposition is at the moment. On the one hand there is the paralysed SPO, and on the other – absorbed by endless negotiations about relations among its members – stands the Alliance for Changes – SZP. Characteristic for both groups is that they are not capable of working out an initiative suitable to meet the needs of the time. But, when consequences of the attempt on Draskovic's life are concerned, on the Serbian and the political scene of FR Yugoslavia, everything is in the hands of the president of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic and his men.

In his assessment of the attack in Budva and establishing a connection of it with the recent murder of Goran Zugic, Djukanovic's advisor for security, Montenegrin minister of internal affairs Vukasin Maras says that this is a “monstrous conspiracy from Belgrade which is transferred from Serbia to Montenegro”. In other words: the regime in Serbia is nowadays indicted not only for various catastrophic political moves, but also for specific ordered murders. Should this actually be proved in the investigation, at least two things will be certain: the current Montenegrin authorities will be given legitimacy to make moves in the direction of further state independence and further reinforcement of its own security forces, and a shadow of such state terror will fall on political life in Serbia that all institutions will lose even the pale picture of reason for their existence they still have. Of course, there is the possibility of an attempt to reach an agreement between certain institutions of Podgorica and Belgrade – if the investigation confirms accusations – and of hushing up the whole case. It is not clear, however, what Milosevic can offer Djukanovic at this moment that would make the latter give up on discrediting of his greatest opponent. Especially because Belgrade practically does not have a mechanism for increasing pressure on Podgorica; the Army of Yugoslavia is in this context used to stir up fear and nobody seriously relies on its actual actions.

The regime in Serbia at this moment publicly does not pay special attention to Montenegrin and Draskovic's accusations. State media published that the leader of SPO was slightly wounded in shooting, so that it is possible to get the impression that this was a dubious showdown. Only in the commentary of Tanjug state news agency, the attempt on Draskovic's life was marked as “so-called”, and secretary of the main board of Yugoslav Left and federal minister of telecommunications Ivan Markovic accused “Madeleine Albright, Milo Djukanovic and terrorists from Otpor” for the attack. As usual, responsibility is laid at the door of CIA and Washington and the domestic political opponents. Credibility and fundamental obeying of the rules of common sense in order to achieve this are of no significance. If accusations continue and if they are corroborated, it should be expected that the regime will resort to the announced anti-terrorist law with the pretext of a struggle against conspiracy of various foreign intelligence services and their local “exponents”, and that repression in the country will further increase. One thing is for sure: the time of total uncertainty still lies ahead.

Philip Scwarm (AIM)