National Identity and Civil Society in Greece
AIM Athens, May 23, 2000
Some main elements of "national identity," as it is forged and understood in Greece, can be grasped in the following examples:
On March 25, the day commemorating Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire, the University of Thessaloniki gave the famous composer and politician Mikis Theodorakis an honorary Ph.D. In his speech, Mr. Theodorakis included the following passage, "[There is an] opposition between two worlds - the Greek and the other. And when I say 'the other,' I mean collectively the Eastern despotism, the Jewish monotheism, the Roman militarism and the Western authoritarianism." Mikis Theodorakis is so popular that the majority of Greeks have proposed him for the Nobel Peace Prize, the Prime Minister being the first to sign the proposal. Mikis Theodorakis is not counted among the ultra-nationalists of Greece. Quite the contrary. He is the one who gave the famous concerts in Ephesus, Turkey, in the name of Greek-Turkish friendship.
Back in 1992, huge rallies were organized by most of the Greek political parties, challenging the right of our northern neighbor to call itself 'Macedonia.' Nobel Prize winner Odysseas Elytis wrote at the time, "Our name is our soul." It seems that he forgot that 'others' have souls too. Odysseas Elytis is not a renowned nationalist either. His most famous poem, "Axion esti," is an anti-war tribute.
Two years ago, in 1998, none other than Greek President Kostas Stefanopoulos, during a visit to the Holy Mount Athos, spoke of the "vicious threat from the West," a place populated by "Protestants and Papists." This statement was met without any criticism from either the government or any other political party. To add to this, on January 3, the archbishop of Greece Christodoulos stated that President Clinton "has blood on his hands." In the beginning of last year, the Pope decided to cancel his visit to Greece. This happened just a day after the Holy Synod --the Greek Church's ruling body of bishops-- called on the Pope to apply formally to be received as a religious leader in Greece and to "apologize" for the wrong-doings of the Catholic Church during the Crusades.
A couple of years ago, the "Greek-Serbian Friendship Association" collected three million signatures in support of the indicted war criminal Radovan Karadjic. Meanwhile, the Greek authorities have not arrested a single one of the Greek volunteers, who proudly participated in the Srebrenica massacre.
It was also in 1998 that Theodoros Pangalos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, accused the American and the Turkish consulate authorities in Thessaloniki and Komotini of hypocrisy and divisive policies, inter alia. He argued that "maybe due to excessive conscientiousness, they come here and search in our drawers, wardrobes, and souls to discover violations of human rights." In the same year, Mr. Pangalos stated, "In Greece, there is no Macedonian minority. Of course, I do not want to teach anybody any lessons, but I think that those who invent a minority are sick people, sick in their minds."
National identity is conceived through the widely accepted image of 'the other.' The above examples are sufficient to give an idea as to how the notion of 'national identity' is perceived in Greece - on the one hand, Greeks consider themselves a superior nation and, on the other hand, they see the Greek nation threatened by its various 'enemies.' According to this mindset, national identity in Greece always has to be defended against the nation's 'enemies.' The principal enemies are: the neighbors, who conspire against the nation's sovereignty; ethnic and religious minorities, who are agents of the neighbors; the West, because it speaks of minorities, because it is favorable to the neighbors and because it undermines the nation's religion and culture; 'the other' in general, i.e. refugees and immigrants.
It is worth pointing out that these enemies are images of the past, but they have been re-discovered after the collapse of the bipolar system, which awakened nationalist passions in Greek life. With the passive toleration of all Greek governments, a sense of insecurity has been installed in the Greeks, making the defense of national identity the ultimate value and duty of every Greek citizen. It is the ideology of the "single nation" or of the "brotherless nation," as a former President of the country put it. In reality, however, it is nothing else but the defensive character of ethno-nationalism common to many Balkan countries.
At the same time, the official government position is schizophrenically opposed to the attitude of society at large. The government's position therefore is that Greece belongs to the West, that it should make every effort to enter the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU and to develop good relations with its neighbors. The contradiction between the political line of the government and the ideology of defensive national identity is clear. This ideology penetrates all political parties without exception, although in most of them there are smaller or bigger anti- nationalist factions. It also penetrates the vast majority of society.
The term "society" here stands for both people and non-governmental institutions. Society as such, even though not under the direct influence of the government, has a very important role. The mainstream media reflects and expresses the sentiment of Greek society. That is why, generally speaking, the media is more nationalist than the government.
Can one attribute the term "civil society" to this vast majority of people and institutions? Of course, it is a matter of definition. In the wide definition, according to which civil society comprises all institutions and associations, not belonging to the government, the answer is "Yes, this is civil society." In the narrow definition, however, the answer is "No, this is not civil society." According to that definition the term "civil society" is attributed to the democratic society of citizens, which constantly questions governmental institutions and practices on the basis of democratic principles and individual human rights.
As far as political parties are concerned, there are reasons for their contradictory behavior. First, the utmost carrier of defensive nationalism is the Greek Orthodox Church and the Church is too powerful to be contested. Second, the important economic interests of various people like army officers, editors, journalists and others are vested in the 'recycling' of defensive nationalism. Last, but not least, any explicit disagreement with this widely shared national identity consciousness, might lead to loss of influence for the political party or the leader who dare challenge it.
In brief, it seems that the ideology of defensive national identity is fed by society onto its political and religious leaders, to the detriment of democracy. This ideology damages the democratic values in an otherwise democratic regime, as the one of Greece. Not surprisingly, therefore,
The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly condemned Greece for the violation of religious freedom of its non-Orthodox citizens (who nonetheless do not exceed 3% of the overall population).
The Greek State persists in mentioning the religion of the Greek citizens on their identity cards, thus violating international law. Given the privileged status of the Greek Orthodox Church, this clearly functions as blackmail. In the beginning of May 2000, the new Minister of Justice Michalis Stathopoulos, declared this approach illegal, due to the fact that it violates the law on the protection of personal data. The reaction of the Church was so immediate, that the next day the government's spokesperson had to state that the declaration was no more than the Minister's personal opinion.
Greece has not ratified as yet the Framework Convention for the Protection of Ethnic Minorities, almost three years after it signed it, despite repeated commitments by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Ethnic minorities are either not recognized at all (e.g. the ethnic Macedonian minority), or are recognized only as religious minorities (e.g. the ethnic Turkish minority, usually referred to as 'Muslim speaking minority' --as if there is a Muslim language-- only to avoid the use of the word "Turk").
The various ways of discriminating against refugees and immigrants are not exclusively Greek. They are part and parcel of the pan-European nationalistic trends.
In this unfriendly environment, democratic civil society and its values cannot flourish. Civil society is the society of free, democratic citizens, and not of political parties. In order for such a society to develop, a country needs the consolidation of democracy and the underlying democratic values. Since civil society is inimical to any human rights violations, it is only natural that it mobilizes against violations linked to defensive national identity. At the same time it challenges the notion of defensive national identity. The existence of civil society becomes synonymous to anti- nationalism. That is why civil society seems to be unpopular with both the political parties and the majority of society in Greece. Clearly, in a society like the Greek one, it is not surprising that democratic civil society is making its first steps.
Dionyssis Goussetis