The End of Izetbegovic's Era

Where is SDA Heading

AIM SARAJEVO, May 6, 2000

Replacement of several officials at the session of the Main Board of the ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA) last weekend in April, did not solve anything nor marked the end of the process of internal settling of accounts. Party dismissals, i.e. voting of no-confidence to the President of the Federation, Ejup Ganic, and three Governors (Tarik Arapcic from Tuzla, Mustafa Mujezinovic from Sarajevo and Rijad Rascic from Gorazde) is only an attempt at informing the public and party followers of the intention to more resolutely sanction the party's poor results at the local elections.

The extraordinary session of the party plenary session (the Main Board of SDA) did not resolve the essential problem of the lower popularity of the SDA and the crisis of its policy. Actually, this is a government crisis which is reflected through SDA and its catastrophic results in all spheres to which no answer has been offered. On the other hand, the inter-party conflict is growing in proportion with the loss of power. For the first time the party tigers have attacked even Izetbegovic himself, whom the party veterans have accused of having privatised the party.

"SDA is one-man party" said Omer Behmen, Izetbegovic's fellow inmate from prison days back in 1946 from the times of the Young Muslim Movement. Izetbegovic survived the attack of the party's right wing (Behmen, Cengic, Brka), but this was the first time that his charisma has been undermined. Question is whether, in conflicts that are ahead of him, he will have enough strength to remain the indisputable arbitrator, as he was until now.

The conflict within the SDA is interesting in many respects: first because of the Izetbegovic's position, because of the new balance of forces in the party top ranks, as well as because of the consequences that internal shocks will have on the administration of power. Journalistic analysis differ as to the consequences the dismissals might have on the party itself.

However, the assessment that the election of new men to the SDA Presidency means a turn to the right, is disputable. Edhem Bicakcic, Nedzad Latic and Hasan Cengic are former Izetbegovic's prison inmates and also members of the top leadership, while only Cengic and Latic represent the so called religious stream in the top party ranks. None of Izetbegovic's peers and founders of the party are any longer in power. The only remaining powerful personalities are Sulejman Tihic, whose star has been in the ascendant for the last year or so, and Safet Orucevic, who has announced his resignation from all functions because, as he had put it, he wanted to dedicate all his time to Mostar. The others can be considered Izetbegovic's men without any personal political colouring. They are simply followers.

For example, if young Nedzad Brankovic were not the Director of "Energoinvest" or Mehmed Corhodzic, Director of "Borac" from Travnik no one outside the party would hear of them. It is therefore premature to conclude that the party has taken a turn to the right because Cengic and Latic are in the leadership. This Presidency will follow Izetbegovic and the leader will have no opponents. Hasan Cengic is the only one capable of snapping back at the chief, but he is in the minority.

On the other hand, Edhem Bicakcic's position has grown stronger. He was the only one to survive the party test of confidence (according to sources, with Cengic's and Behmen's support) and will not be removed from the Prime Minister's post. If predictions that he will be transferred to Ganic's place of the first man of the Federation come true, Bicakcic will grow politically stronger: he will have less responsibility, but will control the entire executive authority through his people he has already deployed in the apparatus.

The greatest loser in these party skirmishes is none else but the current President of the Federation, Ejup Ganic. Actually, he paid the price for distancing himself from his party colleagues, for insisting on his academic titles, for his world connections and knowledge of English language. Well-placed sources claim that Ganic was not close to anyone and that he was mislead to believe that his word mattered and that he was sharing power with several other party frontmen. However, Ganic did not have any authentic political power nor, as political language would call it, did not enjoy the support of rank and file. Back in 1990 Izetbegovic adopted him and appointed him to the state Presidency. It was just a political trade: SDA provided the votes and Ganic relinquished his Yugoslavdom (note of the author- he was elected on the Yugoslav list) and image of a world expert for one thing or the other (no one knows to this very day for what?), which he pointed out all the time. Later on he even became Vice-President of the party, but never had important personal influence. He was not popular among the members of his own party and that is the main reason for his fall.

But, to public surprise, and even of the SDA, Ganic expressed his personal revolt and refused to accept his party's order to offer his resignation to the function of the President of the Federation, which only aggravated the conflict and opened the "Ganic case".

SDA announced that its Delegate Club in Parliament will start the procedure for Ganic's removal. However, this is where the story gets complicated. According to the Federation Constitution only the Constitutional Court can replace the President after both chambers of Parliament secures two-thirds majority of votes in favour of such a move. On the other hand, Ganic has the authority to dissolve the Parliament in specific circumstances! It is a big question whether SDA can secure two-thirds majority vote in Parliament, and even if it can, the question remains when will the Constitutional Court bring its decision on this matter. In this case, time is on Ganic's side and against SDA which this scandal can further undermine and contribute to its total loss of power at parliamentary elections this fall.

The Ganic case opens up yet another problem for SDA - the method of rule over this party and excessive interlinking of the party and the state which is reflected in the total disregard of procedures which, as usual, the democracy first fell victim to. This model of rule cost SDA the loss of support at the local elections. However, it seems that the main problem was that SDA was not able to meet a challenge of the times. In early nineties, SDA developed as a national-religious movement for, as it was claimed, the protection of Muslims (later of Bosniacs), as well as defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. The electoral success of this party in 1990 is fully attributable to the deliberately generated fear of other two extreme nationalisms in B&H (Serbian and Croatian). In the years of peace SAD did not manage to transform itself from the movements into a party. If we add to this disastrous results of its rule - ranging from incompetence to corruption - then the reaction of voters was quite logical.

The extraordinary session of the Main Board revealed the confusion that ruled within the party. No programme document was offered at this session: namely SDA has no idea how to win back people's confidence, revive the economy or develop an efficient administration. Actually, it did not offer an original answer to numerous challenges of the times. It missed its chance of making a total turnabout in winter 1997 when at the New Year's reception Izetbegovic announced that SDA would be transformed into a civil party. However, six months earlier, at the party Congress, a step backwards was made, i.e. the party once again put its retrograde ideas in the forefront. At that time, Izetbegovic formulated the political objectives that included the defence of Bosnia and Bosniacdom based on Islamic values, thus virtually defining once and for all the vision of B&H as the state of only his nation and his party.

At the last session of its leadership, SDA proved incapable of true transformation by reducing problems to personal level. The question everything is revolving around is how will processes within SDA evolve after Izetbegovic. Namely, one should not lose sight of Izetbegovic's age, as well as his poor health. At a reception in early spring of 1997, editor of the Sarajevo magazine "Days" asked Izetbegovic why wouldn't he retire and prepare his party and state for the post-Izetbegovic era. Izetbegovic explained that he kept the function in the state Presidency because the international factor wanted a man capable of resolving problems.

His decision to remain at the party's helm, Izetbegovic explained with the fear that the "right margin" could win in inter-party conflicts. "The right is more belligerent, and its demagogy more convincing for the moderate members", explained Izetbegovic at that time. He saw himself as the supreme arbitrator capable of striking a balance and thus avoid the schism in which, we must admit, he was successful until now. But, his charisma is gradually weakening. while he has avoided making a radical cut in the party and removing its right wing. Some analysts think that an open conflict between Izetbegovic, on the one, and Behmen and Cengic, on the other side, is inevitable.

There are forecasts that that will be the main line of separation in the post-Izetbegovic era. Its already observed beginning actually means the end of Izetbegovic's rule.

Emir HABUL

(AIM, Sarajevo)