What Is Milosevic Up To?

Behind the public uproar - in which last week chairman of the People's Assembly of Serbia Dragan Tomic distinguished himself again with the declaration that mother of Zoran Djindjic is a Croat and that he was brought up by an uncle who was an Ustashe - Slobodan Milosevic is making much more profound preparations for the immediate future.

AIM Podgorica, 22 April, 2000

(By AIM correspondent from Belgrade)

The massive participation of the citizens at the rally in Belgrade seems to have surprised everybody: the participants themselves, the leaders of the united opposition and the regime against which the gathering was organised. The very presence of more than one hundred thousand people at the square of the Republic and the surrounding streets clearly demonstrated the citizens' support to the slogan of the rally: "Stop the Terror, For Free Elections!" The relief and the joy because of the overcome fear were almost tangible in the air and the message of the present citizens to the opposition leaders - here we are, we will support you, if you know what you will do and how you will proceed about it - could be felt and heard from the people in the square while the speakers took turns on the platform.

Unconcealed relief - and enthusiasm caused by the response of the citizens - was expressed by all the leaders of the united opposition on that very same day. The regime media, along with the customary minimisation of the gathering, gave priority to the "separatists" from Voivodina: Dragan Veselinov, Mile Isakov and Nenad Canak. The latter, succumbing to emotions which could not have been caused or stirred up by the disposition of the people present, at one moment "promised" the leaders of the regime that they would hang on lamp posts. For days state media have been repeating and commenting on this threat as the "true" picture of democracy which the treacherous, janissary, renegade opposition was fighting for. Subsequent explanations given by Canak ("What I have said at the rally is nothing in comparison to what I really think", later relativisation by stressing the form "If they do this, then...") increase the impression of certain analysts that the head of the League of Social Democrats of Voivodina is some kind of "democratic Seselj" in the ranks of the opposition.

All public opinion polls show the same picture: disposition of majority of the voters against those in power. The public is not so much in favour of the opposition as much as it is against the regime, which is visible from the predominant and growing segment of the indecisive voters. This trend is confirmed by the just published results of consecutive investigations done by Strategic Marketing agency in September and November last and in March this year. The decline of the support to the regime (from 24.3 to 21.8 per cent) contributed less to the rise in favour of the opposition (from 27.9 to 28.2 per cent) than to that of the group of the indecisive (from 34.1 to 41 per cent). This increase of the number of indecisive voters - even from the group of abstainees which during the same period decreased from 13.7 to 9 per cent - can easily be explained not only by long and tedious negotiations about the union, but also by the incapability of the opposition in Serbia, along with the poorly concealed discord and contempt among the leaders, to clearly articulate the ways in which it intends to ensure fair election conditions, how it will take over power and what it means to do with it. The only thing that is certain is that the indecisive will decide the destiny of Serbia, in other words, the parties which in described circumstances find a way to convince the indecisive about the necessity of changes.

The growing anti-regime disposition among the public is even more evident from the support offered to individual parties and coalitions. The closest to the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) which still enjoys the highest amount of support of the voters (16.5 per cent) is the League for Changes (11.2), while due to constant or occasional collaboration with the regime, according to the opinion of analysts, the greatest decline of support is registered by the Serb Revival Movement (8.2) and the Serb Radical Party (4.3). Majority of the opponents of the regime would not even cross the threshold in a proportional election system, and dispersion of the voters in different electoral districts would diminish the results even of the few most powerful opposition parties. The fact that voters do not even know the names of many parties or coalitions certifies about it. Their leaders do not enjoy significant support either: almost half of the pollees would not support even one of them, while among those who are able to make up their minds Slobodan Milosevic still enjoys more than double support than Vuk Draskovic (17.2 in relation to 7 per cent) and even greater than Dragoslav Avramovic (5.6), Vojislav Kostunica (4.7) or Vojislav Seselj (3.8). Supporters of the League for Changes (SZP) as an expressedly non-leader coalition more frequently give support to Dragoslav Avramovic as a non-partisan personage than to Zoran Djindjic, president of the most powerful party in SZP.

Diversion of the attention of the public from the leaders in favour of the opposition as a whole is one of the charasterictic and important changes in the electorate. Srdjan Bogosavljevic, director of the Strategic Marketing agency stresses that "league" "united", "joined", "unified", are the magic words of the opposition scene, which is also visible from the fact that, for instance, the League for Changes has twice as many sympathisers than all the parties that form it put together. In brief, the citizens of Serbia support the opponents of the regime only if they act together. This is the message for which the opposition leaders so far had not much understanding, contrary to Slobodan Milosevic. So far he used the disunion among his opponents more than successfully, occasionally even toying with their enchantment with the sweetness of power to the extent that they were satisfied with the crumbs of it he chose to throw to them.

Since the last year's NATO bombing, Milosevic's regime is more successfully stabilised by propaganda of reconstruction of the country than by satanising the opposition complete disappearance of which from the scene was calmly predicted by Slobodan Milosevic at the convention of his Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). And of course, it is still "treacherous", "the fifth column" which wishes to "dismember the state" and hand it over to "those who bombed it". Behind the public uproar - in which last week chairman of the People's assembly of Serbia Dragan Tomic distinguished himself by declaring that mother of Zoran Djindjic was a Croat and that he was brought up by an uncle who was an Ustashe - Slobodan Milosevic is making much more profouned preparations for the immediate future.

In the past months, without paying heed to other posts they are holding, Milosevic has deployed his strongest cadre to the posts of presidents of municipal committees of SPS in the biggest opposition strongholds. This move has already been interpreted as a preparation for local elections, probably the first in which the regime and the opposition will directly clash and test their strength against each other. The fact that the election law practically forces it to run in local elections with a single list of candidates if it intends to win has given certain advantage to the opposition over the ruling coalition whose support in public opinion polls varies depending on whether it will run as a "left" coalition of SPS and JUL or in the present "red-and-black" variant which is supported by a smaller percentage of voters. But, even before the elections - by bribing deputies and manipulating the quorum of local assemblies - it is trying to "win back" power: two weeks ago it succeeded in doing this in Zrenjanin, but not in Belgrade municipality of Mladenovac.

When the most important - Republican - elections are concerned, independent analysts agree with the assessment of Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia that the opposition would stand better chances - because of the way electoral districts are "cut", regional foundations of a certain number of opposition parties and the differences among the political platforms they advocate - if few coalitions would be created because votes would disperse or be lost if monarchists and republicans, regionalists and unitarians, "minority" and "majority" parties ran together, since their union may be explained only by Murphey's law which says that great necessity makes strange partners. On the other hand, the "Croatian recipe" - a few opposition blocks against the regime - in Serbia brings more risks than mutual conflicts and "robbing" each other of votes, than cooperation in winning over the support of the individually strongest "party of the indecisive".

Using the popularity which the Army of Yugoslavia has won during last year's NATO bombing, and having deployed a few obedient generals to very important posts, Milosevic proclaimed himself "supreme commander" although this post does not even exist. For a long time neglected for account of the police, the army has in the past few months been showered by thousands of medals and awards and even greater proliferation of promises that its financial position will improve. Vlajko Stojiljkovic, head of Serbian police, which probably has the largest number of unresolved murder cases, on the very eve of the rally of the opposition, announced closer cooperation between the army and the police agreed at his meeting with the head of the general staff Nebojsa Pavkovic at which he was accompanied by heads of public and state security services of Serbia. Military analyst Dragan Vuksic, former military attache of FRY in Bonn, assesses this move as continuation of Milosevic's aspiration "to have these two instruments of force he relies on linked to each other as intimately as possible, to have them become one organisation, in order to prolong his survival in power and introduce dictatorship if necessary".

The regime rejects every idea about an agreement with the opposition, especially a round table about the election conditions, which was the immediate cause for the union of the opposition in October 1999. When the regime is concerned, this year is an election year in any case; there will be nothing early in Serbia - especially no early elections on any level, from local to federal - which is the main demand of united opposition. Instead of that the assembly of Serbia, that is, only the deputies of the ruling coalition, passed amendments of the law on local self-administration and elections. Not favourable for the opposition, of course. By the end of October, when the deadline for local elections is expiring, the regime still has some time to think of a way to ensure winning back power in forty odd cities and towns it lost in 1996/97.

Uncertainty and public discord among opposition parties about running in the elections and making up lists of candidates are one of the items concerning which the regime will test the firmness of the unity of its opponents.

The forthcoming local elections in Podgorica and Herceg-Novi are also an opportunity for Milosevic to estimate harmlessly for himself the disposition of the electorate in Montenegro towards the coalition of the "left" and "patriotic" forces which are very much alike the ruling coalition in Serbia. The recently publicised election cooperation with the Radicals and the Leftists has brought the Socialist People's Party of Momir Bulatovic to the verge of a split. This test could also be a test of the "people's" support to federal elections which are rejected by the government of Milo Djukanovic under current conditions in the federation. Serbian opposition will also have to define exactly relations with Montenegro. The "love affair" with Milo Djukanovic has so far produced not much more than exchange of verbal statements. On the other hand, it does not seem that the Montenegrins are really happy with the loud silence of Serbian opposition about the more and more frequent announcements of "disunion" from Podgorica and the more and more firmly closed border Serbia put up towards Montenegro.

The regime has less and less space for creating crisis centres and conflicts which would forcibly produce "unity of the people". Physically it is reduced to the bordering region towards Kosovo, that is to municipalities of Bujanovac, Medvedja and Presevo, where in the past months incidents have become frequent as well as conflicts of the police with armed groups of Kosovo Albanians which are raiding there parts of the country from Kosovo. Milosevic's New Year's message to Montenegro that "it may go" has not made Djukanovic's position easier, neither in respect to the citizens divided concerning the idea of survival of FR Yugoslavia nor in respect to the world which is publicly against Montenegrin formal independence. Possible "departure" of Montenegro and actual leaving the problem of Kosovo to the international community to deal with, offers Milosevic a possibility to "create" another new and smaller "Yugoslavia" which he would rule after July 2001 when his term in the office of president of FRY expires.

Finally, in the past few days Greece has increasingly been denying that it has offered good services in alleged contacts of the United States with Milosevic. Speculations that talks have been going on an offer/demand of guarantees of personal security are less probable than the confirmed information that the Americans are interested in re-establishing diplomatic relations with FRY. In such a confusion, the citizens of Serbia are cherishing more hope every day in the elections which have neither even been scheduled, nor does anybody know under what conditions they will be scheduled, nor how the opposition will run in them. And finally, nor what should be done after that.

Aleksandar Ciric

(AIM)