RUGOVA WINS VOTERS WITH SILENCE WHILE THAQI SILENCES CRITICISM

AIM Pristina, January 30, 2000

When OSCE, as one of the pillars of UN administration in Kosovo, took over the task of democratising Kosovo and organising free elections there, before launching pre-election campaigns its officials undertook a series of "measures" such as working drills of political parties, organising of round tables, seminars, etc. However, for the local political circles the day the UN Chief Administrator for Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner signed the agreement on the establishment of the so called Provisional Administrative Authority

• a joint organs with some Kosovo political factors - marked the beginning of the pre-election campaign.

Although it is not yet certain when the elections will be held (the local ones were announced for September), it seems that Kouchner has chosen a right moment to rally around himself the three Albanian leaders who were

key personalities at the signing of the Rambouillet Agreement, some time

before NATO bombing of the Serbian military targets in FRY. Hasim Thaqi,

former KLA leader and current president of the Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo, a structure that has originated from KLA ranks, Ibrahim Rugova, President of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, and Rexhep Qosja, President of the United Democratic Movement, sitting at the same table with Kouchner, have signed an agreement on the joint administration of Kosovo with UNMIK, which according to UN officials is first such case in the world for this

organisation to share the power with local political factors.

Today in Kosovo there are 24 active political parties, but these three have been characterised as key factors for any political process. After the signing of the Agreement other parties seriously objected against this undemocratic establishment of the "authorities" and the "opposition". Mr.Kouchner has ensured much better electoral conditions for parties led by these three politicians. Apart from stopping all activities parallel to

those of his administration, by keeping them close to himself and offering them positions in the Department, Kouchner has put them "high up" while leaving others in the opposition, which is why it is common opinion that

this will reflect on the final outcome of free elections.

Actually, parties of the minorities will also be represented in the Provisional Administrative Council, but in view of the population structure in Kosovo (90 percent are Albanians), it is understandable that they stand no chance against the Albanian parties. For two months now the analysts have been forecasting and speculating about potential candidates for the

president of Kosovo at the forthcoming elections, although there is no special decree envisaging the holding of presidential elections in Kosovo. Some independent associations have already carried out public opinion surveys and according to them Ibrahim Rugova is still far ahead before Hasim Thaqi, leader of the Party of Democratic Progress.

In international circles Rugova is known as an extremely moderate Albanian politician. His party was first to opt for democratic orientation after the fall of communism in Kosovo, i.e. as far back as 1989. He tried to keep Milosevic's army away from Kosovo by peaceful means and convincingly won at two "free elections" held in Kosovo (he did not have an opposing candidate), which the international community never recognised. Nevertheless, at that time Rugova was accepted by the Albanians as their

President and by the international factors as their leader.

However, his option of peaceful resistance significantly weakened with the emergence of the KLA (the Kosovo Liberation Army) in 1998, and particularly in 1999 when OVK started armed struggle against Milosevic's police forces and overshadowed Rugova's pacifism which did not manage to achieve the set goal in ten years. Rugova suffered his first serious defeat from no one else but his present opponent Thaqi during the stay of the Albanian delegation in Rambouillet. Thaqi was accepted by the international community as Chairman of the delegation and Rugova as its member, as DSK

was seen as inferior factor in comparison with the military power of OVK to realise a peace agreement.

Rugova lost many political points and potential voters during NATO air strikes. He was Milosevic's hostage and, under threat, gave some statements for which his opponents claim were against the interests of the Albanian

people. What is more interesting, he refuted those statements with rather mild words, which caused the dissatisfaction of young Kosovars. When NATO (KFOR) entered Kosovo, Rugova again lost quite a number of sympathisers,

but Thaqi neither succeeded in convincing the people that he had liberated Kosovo with his army. At that time Rugova was in Italy and, although one of the most renowned politicians, was the last to return to the country.

However, the lack of political experience of political structures which have sprung up from OVK ranks, also brought them negative points, particularly their transparent criticism of Rugova whom they even accused of treason. Sharp criticism only provoked an opposite reaction - dissatisfaction of the broad masses with people around Thaqi. As criticism of Rugova grew louder, he grew more silent. According to analysts Rugova

for years pursued a powerful strategy: he eliminated his opponents with

silence. He never argued, nor accused anyone. His strategy was patience

messages that everything will be fine and vocabulary brimming with democracy, along with clear orientation towards the independence of Kosovo. Realising that criticism had gone too far, Thaqi softened his vocabulary as did those around him, who were even more critical of Rugova. In Rambouillet, Thaqi, Rugova and Qosja agreed on and signed the Agreement on the establishment of a provisional government of Kosovo, which at that time was to lead a struggle against Serbia.

However, this moderate politician never recognised this Agreement and never participated in that government, while Thaqi and Qosja were its part until the formation of the Joint Administrative Authority with UNMIK. After the war the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo again lost much. Its field organisations joined OVK in the struggle against Serbian people, despite

the disagreement of their leader -Rugova - so that in the last period many branches and sub-branches joined Thaqi's party. These were mostly front men of these branches so that Thaqi can boast that the Presidency of his party includes men who were once Rugova's close associates.

If DSK once won 90 percent of votes at internationally unrecognised elections, the situation has much changed and it is now faced with serious rivals from the structures of former KLA, which enjoy the support of younger people - who, tired of Rugova's "moderateness", have opted for a

more extreme approach. Nevertheless, since Thaqi did not know how to keep the advantage he had gained after the war, Rugova is now wisely coming back to the political scene. It is generally believed that in comparison to the former OVK leader, with whom he was on rather bad terms until lately, Rugova has much more voters behind him than it may seem at first glance.

Aware that even after NATO's arrival to Kosovo the local political structures are still fuelling mutual acute rivalries, Kouchner has decided to form joint governing bodies of the UN Mission and the mentioned Albanian parties in order to control the escalation of political rivalry, but also political and mafia crime. It is not without reason that Kouchner brought three leaders together. He does not want to have two strong political forces as he fears that the case of Albania could be repeated and wants to avoid a situation in which any party that loses the election would be strong enough to block the institutional life. Analysts assume that Kouchner wants to have three factors - two strong ones and one that would keep the balance. It is estimated that Qosja does not stand any chance of opposing Thaqi and Rugova alone, which is also evident from all public opinion surveys carried out till now.

Already now there are suggestions that after free elections, the model of joint rule over Kosovo should be applied as the only option for overcoming anarchy after years of non-functioning of democratic institutions in Kosovo. Having this in mind, it is possible to control appetites for power to certain extent, since all three leaders are aware that, no matter who

wins, they might be forced once again to form coalitions after the elections.

AIM Pristina

Zijadin GASHI