Greek-Turkish Amazing Rapprochement

AIM Athens, January 30, 2000

Anyone following the mid-January official visit of George Papandreou in Turkey (the first of a Greek foreign minister since 1962) and the euphoria surrounding it could not but be amazed given the state of the Greek-Turkish relations in the first half of 1999. In the beginning of last year, the two countries were only recovering from a period of being almost at each other's throat over the issue of the deployment of sophisticated Russian missiles S-300s in Cyprus, a casus belli for Turkey: showing sound judgment at the eleventh hour, Greeks and Greek-Cypriots had agreed to deploy them instead in Crete. Then, a second crisis broke out, when a Turkish commando, with Kenyan complicity, abducted Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan on his way to the Nairobi airport aftre he had left his hideout at the Greek Embassy there. Turkey accused Greece of fostering terrorism, and a glossy leaflet providing related "evidence" was widely distributed internationally. With US complicity, Turkey was pressuring Greece to admitting that it even hosted training camps for PKK fighters. At the same time, Greece and Turkish policies towards the Kosovo war were diverging. Greece was trying to balance its NATO membership with its just redefined Balkan interests. Turkey, on the other hand, was an enthusiastic supporter of the strikes, both because they were ostensibly aiming at defending an oppressed Muslim minority in the Balkans and because her role, like during the Gulf war, reconfirmed how valuable it was to NATO and through it to the West.

It was therefore a small surprise against such background to see the two countries' foreign ministers agreeing in June to launch some low-level bilateral discussions on mostly non-divisive issues. While they began cautiously in July, two unscheduled events showed on both sides that the time was ripe for bolder moves. First, the Greek foreign minister opened many Turkish eyebrows by admitting that members of the "Muslim minority" in Greece can freely identify themselves as Turks and that Greece will probably end up recognizing a Turkish minority. "Bravo Yorgos!" [after the foreign minister's first name] was a front page headline in Ankara: the fact that the latter led to a backlash reaction in Greece only helped persuade the Turkish side that Greek diplomacy was headed by a sincere reformer.

Then, nature struck Turkey in August, with a devastating earthquake that cost over 15,000 lives. International solidarity was abundant, but among the very first to arrive to the scene were Greek rescue and medical teams. Some members of the latter have later explained how cautious they were when arriving, in view of generation-old animosities between the two countries. But the ice did not take more than a few hours to melt in almost all cases. While the Turkish state was perceived by the people as chaotically absent from the rescue, the Greek teams were helping save lives, sometimes live on television. At the same time, back in Greece, sensationalist television newscast had their -only to date- positive result, contributing with their hours-long broadcasts to bringing the two peoples much closer. Politicians on both sides were taken aback: they had cultivated for so long the myth that Greeks and Turks hate each other like Israeli and Palestinians. A myth, essential to prevent rational decision-making in bilateral relations, had passed away under the debris of the earthquake, giving way to an "earthquake diplomacy," strengthened by the reversal of roles in the ensuing, less devastating, Greek earthquake in September.

This rapprochement seemed to gain popularity also in Greece and allowed the country's foreign minister to concretize it by the year's end. Greece was no longer vetoing Turkey's candidacy to the European Union (EU), opting instead to use it so as to promote democratic changes in its neighbor and consequently force it to resort to less provocative ways in presenting whichever claims it had against Greece. Such deal was difficult to achieve, but the EU offered a version satisfactory to Greece in Helsinki in December. Turkey finally accepted it, after hours of wavering, which made the Greek government's related policy choices look like a major success to Greek public opinion.

It was thus possible for the first state visit to occur this month, and for the Greek foreign minister to open it with a gesture that enraged Greece's nationalists and habitual skeptics: laying a wreath at the mausoleum of Kemal Attaturk. Kemal is not only the founder of the modern Turkish state, but also the general who drove the Greek Army from Anatolia some 75 years ago, putting an end to the short-lived dream of a Great Greece: no street of Greece honors his name, while there are many named after modern Serbia's founder Karageorgevits. Another symbolic shock followed: Greece and Turkey had decided on a joint bid for the 2008 European football championships (just like former arch-enemies Japan and Korea jointly host the next World Cup). In the insobriety of the moment, the Greek foreign minister also said that Turkey will be asked to host some of the cultural events accompanying the 2004 summer Olympics to be held in Athens. These joint sport/cultural events require that the two states and their societies are at peace with each other as much as those of any two EU members.

This will take many more efforts to achieve. There had been no breakthrough in any major bilateral issue of conflict yet. Turkey continues to challenge the status quo in the Aegean and to insist on the recognition of a Turkish minority in Greece, while Greece keeps blaming Turkey for the imbroglio in Cyprus and the miserable state of affairs of the Greek minority in Turkey. Only that, already now, these issues are dealt with in a much more civilized way, with small steps in the right direction. Confidence building measures including in the military field are being suggested. For the first time in recent memory, moreover, the teachers from one country went to the minority schools in the other at the beginning of the school year, instead of the usual well-after-Christmas-break habit. While it has been announced that the two governments finally agreed on acceptable textbooks to be sent to the mutual minorities, again for the first time in so many years (though the process works at a camel's pace and the books have yet to reach the schools). Finally, it is no coincidence that the Greek foreign minister insists on the respect to the self-identification of minorities (which means admitting there are Turks in Greece) while in Turkey there are ideas about how the Patriarchate's Theological School in Heybeliada/Halki (in Greater Istanbul) can be reopened and other minority related demands are met with "encouraging silence" by the Turks.

Reaching agreement on major issues will not be easy, as in both countries the skeptics insist that only their country has given in to the other. The decisive factor is certainly Cyprus. If there is movement in the continent's longest deadlock conflict, it will be difficult to prevent a spillover effect on almost all other issues. However, such developments cannot be expected before the next elections in Turkish Northern Cyprus and in Greece, later this year.

In the meantime, it is hoped that the media will refrain from the traditional hostile attitude towards the neighbor that almost brought the two countries to war in 1996, over the uninhabited rocky islet of Imia/Kardak. It is a good sign that the meeting between journalists of the two countries in early February, with the participation of the two foreign ministers, will include many journalists that have been notorious for their hostile commentaries in the past. Most have probably not shed their illusions, but it appears that they now follow the trend that makes repeating them "politically incorrect" which can be detrimental to their image. It is likely that a similar motivation led the leaderships of the usually warring Greek-American and Turkish-American communities to jointly praise the rapprochement.

It would be unfair not to stress the role of the personalities of the two foreign ministers in that rapprochement. Greek George Papandreou and Turkish Ismail Cem had managed in the first half of 1999 to develop a warm friendly relationship and appreciation for each other, which paved the way for these developments. However, as Turks keep claiming that they were always ready for a dialog but Greece was not, it is the role of the Greek foreign minister that was decisive, as indeed Greeks had had a position of no dialog with Turks. Taking over the ministry from Theodore Pangalos after the Ocalan fiasco, Papandreou slowly but steadily changed the course of Greek foreign policy. During the Kosovo war, he managed to steer Greek policy in a way that impressed most Balkan leaders and his Western counterparts, even though he never hid his personal disagreement with the strikes. One of his high points was when he arranged for a reconciliation meeting between the Albanian and the Macedonian foreign ministers, when the first exodus of refugees from Kosovo was ill-received in Macedonia.

Papandreou has now succeeded in implementing a realistic, moderate Balkan policy that Prime Minister Costas Simitis probably had in mind after his electoral victory in 1996. However, then, Pangalos managed to neutralize his deputy foreign minister, Christos Rozakis, the architect of such policy, tolerating if not fueling a dirty, partly anti-Semitic campaign against him that led to his resignation in the end of that year. Simitis, though a personal friend of Rozakis, did not prevent the latter's sacrifice. It was also known that Pangalos had frequent disagreements with then alternate foreign minister George Papandreou, which culminated in keeping him in the dark over the covert operation to give a safe passage to Ocalan to some third country. The public criticism of Papandreou then has been perceived as leading to Pangalos' replacement.

Since then, Panaglos has repeatedly not only disagreed but also slandered his successor and the latter's advisors. He obviously could not do otherwise now. He chose to give an interview to right-wing opposition "Apogevmatini" daily to attack Papandreou for "making substantial concessions to Turkey without receiving anything (in return). () I believe that if we chose to appease the Turks and submit to their plans, we have committed a colossal historical blunder... as Turkey's aims know no limits." Opposition New Democracy applauded Pangalos' remarks. Its spokesperson Aris Spiliotopoulos accused the government of "engaging in new concessions," while Turkey remains unbudged. He particularly criticized Papandreou's stance on his counterpart Ismail Cem's proposal for military cooperation. "The fact that the proposal... which indirectly implies a joint (Aegean) sovereignty... was not only not rejected but forwarded to the minister of defense raises doubts and causes deep anxiety."

On the other hand, Ankara officials praised Papandreou for his courage. "Forget the earthquake. The real thing that happened was George [Papandreou]," one said to "The Times" (21/1/00). While a leading civil society representative had already told this writer, after the Helsinki summit decision in December: "Papandreou deserves a Nobel Peace Prize."

One need not be that enthusiastic. Greece and Turkey have had two short-lived rapprochements, one in the 1930s and one in the early 1950s: both were followed by long periods of conflict. One can only hope that this is not going to be a third short-lived experience. Turkey's candidacy to the EU can help prevent a new regression, if only the other EU members have the patience to help steer Turkey down the long road leading to irreversible democratization.

Panayote Elias Dimitras